Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness

Crowe, Christopher; Meade, Ellen E.

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.06.004

Cited by 241 publications

(144 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…The well-documented empirical correlation between the level of central bank independence and inflation Grilli et al (1991), Cukierman (2008), Crowe and Meade (2008), Arnone et al (2006), Arnone et al (2008) co-existed with an equally early opinion that exercise of functions beyond monetary policy scales down their autonomy. It stands to reason that when calculating the canonic GMT-index, endowing central bank with banking supervision functions was considered good enough grounds to reduce the index figure Grilli et al (1991).…”

Section: Underlying View On the Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Untitled

2017

Visn. Nat. Bank Ukr.

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І. IntroductIonNew macroeconomic phenomena and financial turbulence after the global crisis have long been calling for concentration of researchers' attention to the role of central banks in the "new" context. At the moment, the established "new normal" phenomenon following the rethinking macroeconomic policy leaves the question open on a desirable institutional functioning of monetary authorities. Implementation of nonconventional monetary policy programs has had an impact on changes in its operational design which resulted in further actualization of question how new features of central banks' operation and environment correlate with the central bank status. At the same time, post-crisis developments in central banking and emergence of new responsibilities only emphasize that traditional challenges do not go away but instead are reinforced with the new ones. In post-crisis reality discussions on central bank independence become more pronounced, with financial stability being their integral expression.The problem of defining a role of central bank independence in the area of financial stability is attributed, to a large extent, to the fact that achievements of price stability and financial stability are not always the same thing. Deficiency of the quantitative basis for the latter, lack of tool-kits for achievement of predictable results, discrepancies in the policies are only a few items on the long list of their differences. Despite huge differences between the substance of the two, however, they still have a wide range of issues in common. Among those common grounds are, in particular, the problems of political pressure, dynamic inconsistency, and quality of institutions.In light of the established views in the publications on the problem of independence and critical thinking on the subject in the context of the new reality of central banking after the crisis, the author offers a hypothesis on existence of two basic

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Section: Underlying View On the Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Untitled

2017

Visn. Nat. Bank Ukr.

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“…A number of authors have already studied the relationship between the central bank independence and both macroeconomic performance and inflation rate (Eijffinger and De Haan, 1996;Arnone, Laurens and Segalotto, 2006;Crowe and Meade, 2008). Some works advocate the central bank independence (Forder, 2005), while others argue against it (Freitas, 2006).…”

Section: The First Pillar: Independencementioning

confidence: 99%

Governança em bancos centrais: um estudo comparativo das práticas de governança dos bancos centrais do Brasil, Canadá e Inglaterra

Faria¹,

Streit

2016

Rev. Adm. Pública

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Corporate governance in central banks has evolved in recent years, both as a result of advances made in the study of the subject by supranational organizations, as well as through the adoption of the best practices used in the public and private sectors. This paper aims to identify, analyze and compare key aspects of corporate governance used by the central banks of Brazil, Canada and England in 2015. By reviewing existing literature on the subject, it was possible to analyze certain aspects of the monetary authorities of these three countries in terms of their structures and their committeees, as well as the three pillars of governance normally attributed to central banks: independence, accountability and transparency. The results showed significant differences between the three, and suggested that the degree of maturity of each country's society has a certain influence on the practices of governance adopted by its central bank. Governança em bancos centrais: um estudo comparativo das práticas de governança dos bancos centrais do Brasil, Canadá e InglaterraA governança corporativa em bancos centrais tem evoluído nos últimos anos, tanto em decorrência dos avanços obtidos no estudo do tema por organizações supranacionais como pela adoção das melhores práticas oriundas dos setores público e privado. Este trabalho visa identificar, analisar e comparar os aspectos principais da governança nos bancos centrais do Brasil, Canadá e Inglaterra em 2015. Por intermédio de uma pesquisa bibliográfica foi possível analisar aspectos das autoridades monetárias dos três países em relação à sua estrutura e a seus comitês, e também aos três pilares da governança em bancos centrais: independência, accountability e transparência. Os resultados mostraram que existem diferenças significativas e que o grau de maturidade das sociedades dos países influencia as práticas de governança adotadas pelos bancos centrais.Pal av r a s -c h av e : governança em bancos centrais; comitês; independência; accountability; transparência.Gobernanza de bancos centrales: un estudio comparado de las prácticas de gobernanza de los bancos centrales de Brasil, Canadá e Inglaterra La gobernanza corporativa en los bancos centrales ha evolucionado en los últimos años, tanto como resultado de los avances en el estudio del tema por organizaciones supranacionales como la adopción de las mejores prácticas derivadas de los sectores públicos y privados. Este estudio busca identificar, analizar y comparar los principales aspectos de gobernanza en los bancos centrales de Brasil, Canadá e Inglaterra en 2015. A través de una búsqueda en la literatura fue posible analizar los aspectos de los tres bancos en lo que respecta a su estructura y sus comités, y también los tres pilares de gobernanza en los bancos centrales: independencia, responsabilidad y transparencia. Los resultados mostraron que existen diferencias significativas, y el grado de madurez de la sociedad influye en las prácticas de gobernanza adoptadas por los bancos centrales.Palabras c l av e : gobernanza en b...

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“…There is no optimal way to do this without undermining the procedural advantages of political independence. Weberian legitimating criteria such as transparency of rule implementation and procedural impartiality are often invoked (Crowe and Meade 2008;Hood and Heald 2006). But this pushes the question back recursively one point, because the question still arises as to who has the right to scrutinize the extent of impartiality, and to whom they are to be transparent.…”

Section: Delegated Governance and Non--majoritarian Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Governance and State Structures

Hardiman

2012

Oxford Handbooks Online

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Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness

Cited by 241 publications

References 33 publications

Untitled

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Governança em bancos centrais: um estudo comparativo das práticas de governança dos bancos centrais do Brasil, Canadá e Inglaterra

Governance and State Structures

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