Central Bank Transparency and Information Dissemination: An Experimental Approach

Abstract

In this paper, we propose to compare different partial transparency regimes in order to determine the optimal diessmination policy by the central bank, using an experimental approach. A treatment dedicated to the benchmark situation (where information is fully released) is also available. Our experiment is based on subsequent framework of Morris and Shin (2002), Cornand and Heinemann (2008) and Trabelsi (2012). The predictive power of K-level reasoning is an issue that is addressed also in this paper. Our experiment indicates that-when fully disclosed-players overreact to public information and this overreaction is efficiently reduced when the degree of publicity decreases (i.e. when the fragmentation measure increases). The average weight assigned to common signal decreases over treatments, especially when we establish partial transparent strategy (i.e. fragmented information). The results provide support both for and against global games theoretical predictions. In fact, although players overreact to public signal, their behavior is inconsistent with theoretical equilibrium, which means that the destabilizing effect of public information is less pronounced experimentally than when it does in theory. This is not the case when public information is fragmented; subjects' behavior does approach equilibrium. These observations coincide with both a collective and an individual analyses of behavior.

Research on strategies to enhance the effectiveness of financial information dissemination under the background of rural revitalization

“…However, it can be seen from the survey results that the brand influence of rural commercial banks is dominant in rural areas at present, which is positively related to the fact that rural commercial banks have the largest number of outlets in rural areas and the widest coverage. When most rural audiences choose financial information consultation, the first choice is to conduct business consultation at the nearest outlets [24]. Therefore, physical outlets play an important role in rural information dissemination, which is different from the current practice of financial institutions focusing on online channels and weakening offline channels.…”

Serving organization goals by organizational information dissemination: An empirical study from the Communist Youth League of China

“…However, this conclusion remains in disagreement. Some scholars conclude that reducing public signal precision or entirely withholding information may improve welfare [9]. However, other scholars believe that "public information should always be provided with maximum precision but, under certain conditions, not to all agents."…”