Hilti, L; Brugger, P (2010). Incarnation and animation: physical versus representational deficits of body integrity. Experimental Brain Research, 204(3)
AbstractTwo apparently disparate phenomena of defective body integrity are reviewed. The first concerns dysmelia, characterized by the congenital absence or deformation of limbs, and the focus of the review is on phantom sensations of people with this kind of physical integrity disorder. The second phenomenon consists of non-psychotic individuals' desire to have a healthy limb amputated, which is interpreted as a mismatch between the physical integrity of a particular limb and its representation in multimodal cortical areas of the brain. We outlined commonalities and differences between the two conditions and note the absence, in both areas of research, of a unified theory that would account for the reported phenomenology. Phantom limbs in dysmelia and the desire for limb amputation most likely are the consequence of very early developmental dissociations between physical and phenomenal body shapes. They are mirror images of one another in that the former constitutes an "animation without incarnation" and, the latter, an "incarnation without animation".
Keywords-body integrity identity disorder (BIID) -paraphilias -parietal lobes -body image, body schema -borderlands of psychiatry and neurology 2 This paper examines two apparently disparate phenomena of corporeal awareness. In both, the completeness or integrity of one's own body is hampered. The first is the occurrence of phantom limbs in individuals born with an "incomplete" body, in which the physical body is incomplete, but the missing limb seems to be represented in the subject's brain, at least as can be inferred from its phenomenal presence. The second phenomenon is the strong desire, by non-psychotic and otherwise well-adjusted healthy individuals, to have a fully functional limb removed. In this condition, it can be argued that despite the physical presence of a limb, the lack of acceptance is due to some underrepresentation in the subject's brain. We review the literature on both conditions and propose that phantom sensations of physically absent limbs and the request for removal of normally developed extremities may be mirror images of one another on the conceptual level: an animation without incarnation and an incarnation without animation, respectively.