Centre parties and coalition cabinet formations: a game theoretic approach

Roozendaal, Peter Van

doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.1990.tb00236.x

Cited by 49 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…The dominant player is included in a least one winning coalition, which it can leave to form another winning coalition with new parties, which the old partners cannot make winning. The dominant player must be the largest party, but the largest party is not necessarily a dominant player, in which case there is no dominant player (Van Roozendaal 1990). From the coalition formation theories that ignore policy considerations, we derive the following hypotheses:…”

Section: Coalition Formation Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Theories of coalition formation: An empirical test using data from Danish local government

Skjæveland

Serritzlew

Blom‐Hansen

2007

European J Political Res

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Abstract. Theories of coalition formation represent a diverse set of arguments about why some government coalitions form while others do not. In this article, the authors present a systematic empirical test of the relative importance of the various arguments. The test is designed to avoid a circularity problem present in many coalition studies – namely that the theories are tested on data of national government coalitions in postwar Europe: the very data that gave rise to the theories in the first place. Instead, the authors focus on government coalitions at the municipal level. They base their analysis on an expert survey of almost 3,000 local councillors from all municipalities in Denmark. They use conditional logit analysis to model government formation as a discrete choice between all potential governments. The analysis confirms some, but far from all, traditional explanations such as those based on office and policy motives. At the same time, the analysis raises the question of whether actors really seek minimal coalitions.

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Section: Coalition Formation Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Theories of coalition formation: An empirical test using data from Danish local government

Skjæveland

Serritzlew

Blom‐Hansen

2007

European J Political Res

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“…The dominant player must be the largest party, but the largest party is not necessarily a dominant player. In such a case there is no dominant player (Van Roozendaal 1990). Being dominant may give a party the strength to claim the highest office whether it is that of the Prime Minister or that of the mayor.…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Second, we investigate the dominant player concept.The dominant player is included in a least one winning coalition, which it can leave to form another winning coalition with new parties that the former partners cannot make winning.The dominant player must be the largest party, but the largest party is not necessarily a dominant player. In such a case there is no dominant player (Van Roozendaal 1990). Being dominant may give a party the strength to claim the highest office whether it is that of the Prime Minister or that of the mayor.…”

Section: H2mentioning

confidence: 99%

Which Party Gets the Mayoralty? A Multivariate Statistical Investigation of Danish Local Government Formation

Skjæveland

Serritzlew

2010

Scandinavian Political Studies

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In non‐presidential multiparty systems, it is not only the voters but also coalition formation after the election that decides the government of the community. Some national‐level studies investigate which parties are most likely to win the Prime Minister's office. The aim of this article is to investigate the same question at the local level: What makes a party more likely to win the post of mayor? The article finds that party size and change in size are important along with experience and ideological centrality. The results are similar to those obtained at the national level, and this study thus expands the scope of these explanatory variables. However, the study also shows that being a large party is not sufficient for a party to have a good chance of winning the mayoralty. Furthermore, norms guiding appropriate behaviour seem important in addition to instrumental behaviour. It appears that parties that are popular in the electorate benefit from being perceived as more deserving of the mayoralty than others.

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“…These large parties are, in electoral terms, in government most of the time, and often hold the position of prime minister. Drawing on this concept and theoretical models of government formation developed by Roozendaal (1990) and Deemen (1991), a pivotal center party can be defined as a party with two characteristics: it is located in the middle of the political system, which is assumed to be one‐dimensional; and the party is so large in terms of seats that the wing parties 3 to the right and to the left of it have no realistic chance of gaining a parliamentary majority without the support of either the pivotal center party or parties on the other side of the pivotal center party. In other words, the only way a government can be formed without the support of the pivotal center party is if parties to the left and the right of it join forces in a broad coalition 4…”

Section: Centrifugal Versus Centripetal Forces In Party Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Center Parties, Party Competition, and the Implosion of Party Systems: A Study of Centripetal Tendencies in Multiparty Systems

Green‐Pedersen

2004

Political Studies

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Centripetal party competition is traditionally associated with the need to capture the median voter in a two‐party system, whereas the existence of center parties is associated with centrifugal party competition. This article argues that the existence of a ‘pivotal center party’ leads to centripetal party competition in multiparty systems. A pivotal center party is so strong in electoral terms that forming a majority either to the left or to the right of it is unrealistic. Therefore, office‐seeking political parties are forced on to a centrist course. This dynamic can be so forceful that the major parties to the left and to the right of the center party decide to govern in a broad coalition, and we may speak of an ‘implosion’ of the party system. The theoretical argument can explain party system developments in the Netherlands and Finland.

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Centre parties and coalition cabinet formations: a game theoretic approach

Cited by 49 publications

References 24 publications

Theories of coalition formation: An empirical test using data from Danish local government

Theories of coalition formation: An empirical test using data from Danish local government

Which Party Gets the Mayoralty? A Multivariate Statistical Investigation of Danish Local Government Formation

Center Parties, Party Competition, and the Implosion of Party Systems: A Study of Centripetal Tendencies in Multiparty Systems

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