“…In turn, Rae reformulated Duverger's Law to state that 'plurality formulae are always associated with two-party competition except where strong local minority parties exist' (Rae, 1971, 95), and Riker built upon Rae's reformulation, observing that: 'Plurality election rules bring about and maintain two-party competition except in countries where (1) third parties nationally are continually one of two parties locally and (2) one party among several is almost always the Condorcet winner in elections ' (1982, 761). 6 The electoral system does work to the detriment of minor parties but these parties persist, which means that there are limits to the mechanical and psychological effects postulated by Duverger (Rossiter et al, 1999). SMSP and Duverger's Law have, nonetheless, a powerful effect on the structuring and conduct of politics: first, voters act strategically in voting for the party closest to their preferences; second, there is a powerful incentive against wasting votes; third, parties wish to maximize representation so that there is an incentive to remain distinct; fourth, it tends to reduce the number of effective parties to two located within one dominant issue dimension; and fifth, it encourages singleparty governments with a strong partisan base.…”