Chapter 5 The Economic Theory of Gift-Giving: Perfect Substitutability of Transfers and Redistribution of Wealth

Ythier, Jean Mercier

doi:10.1016/s1574-0714(06)01005-0

Cited by 10 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 120 publications

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“…Blood donation has been classified as an act of ‘collective gift‐giving’ (Mercier Ythier, ). Donating blood is a pro‐social act in the sense that donors incur individual costs in exchange for a collective benefit and contribute by ensuring the blood supply system works well.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Not All Incentives Wash Out the Warm Glow: The Case of Blood Donation Revisited

Costa‐Font

Jofre‐Bonet

Yen

2013

Kyklos

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The issue of the nature of the altruism inherent in blood donation and the perverse effects of financial rewards for blood and/or organ donation has been recently revisited in the economic literature with limited consensus. As Titmuss (1970) famously pointed out, providing monetary incentives to blood donors may crowd out blood supply as purely altruistic donors may feel less inclined to donate if a reward is involved -in addition to having the effect of reducing blood quality. In this paper we examine how favouring different types of incentives are related to the likelihood of donating blood by exploiting a large sample representative of the population of fifteen European countries in 2002 containing information on both donation and attitudes towards incentives. Our results show those who have donated are less likely to favour monetary rewards for blood donation but are more likely to favour non-monetary ones. This is consistent with the idea that while monetary rewards may crowd out blood donation, non-monetary rewards do not.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Not All Incentives Wash Out the Warm Glow: The Case of Blood Donation Revisited

Costa‐Font

Jofre‐Bonet

Yen

2013

Kyklos

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“…For three decades now, reciprocity turned into a central topic in economics (Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl 1993;Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995;Fehr and Gächter 1998;. The rise of behavioural economics provides evidence that many economists have accepted the importance of other regarding preferences-reciprocity being one of them (Mercier Ythier 2006). However, reciprocity and gift-giving as applied in behavioural economics are different from the concept of the Gift introduced by Mauss.…”

Section: Pay-what-you-want Pricingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Gift and Pay-What-You-Want Pricing

Egbert¹

2017

jba

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This paper addresses the participative pricing mechanism of Pay-WhatYou-Want pricing as related to Marcel Mauss's concept of the Gift. Reciprocity is a behavioural pattern imminent to the Gift as well as to Pay-What-You-Want pricing. The paper refers to results from behavioural economics in order to identify factors that positively influence reciprocity. It is argued that the aspects elaborated on in the Gift are also relevant to the PWYW pricing mechanism when it comes to implementations of the latter as one of the corporate pricing strategies.

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“…While the focus of this paper is the normative analysis of the redistribution of wealth, it must be noted that the formal setup developed below implies, as a special case, an important special case of the standard model of general equilibrium with pure public goods (e.g., Foley 1970, Conley 1994). This formal equivalence obtains with an assumption of weak separability of individuals’ allocation preferences relative to their own private consumption and a suitable reinterpretation of commodities (see footnotes 4 and 18 further; also Mercier Ythier 2006, 3.3.3 and 6.1). The distributive liberal social contract, properly reinterpreted, may therefore provide a norm of collective action not only for optimal redistribution but also, more generally, for the optimal provision of any type of pure public good.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Wealth distribution is formally analogous to a pure public good in the presence of nonpaternalistic utility interdependence (Kolm 1966, Hochman and Rodgers 1969; and the subsequent literature on Pareto optimal redistribution reviewed in Mercier Ythier 2006, 6.1).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The two definitions articulate consistently in the sense that the latter implies the former, subject to a mild assumption of nonsatiation of the partial preordering of Pareto associated with individual preference relations over allocation. The second fundamental theorem of welfare economics then applies to distributive Pareto optima; that is, distributive optima are Walrasian equilibria relative to suitable vectors of market prices and individual endowments (Winter 1969, Archibald and Donaldson 1976; and the subsequent literature reviewed in Mercier Ythier 2006, 4.1.2).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Regular Distributive Efficiency and the Distributive Liberal Social Contract

Ythier

2010

J Public Economic Theory

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We consider abstract social systems of private property, made of n individuals endowed with nonpaternalistic interdependent preferences, who interact through exchanges on competitive markets and Pareto-improving lump-sum transfers. The transfers follow from a distributive liberal social contract defined as a redistribution of initial endowments such that the resulting market equilibrium allocation is both: (i) a distributive optimum (i.e., is Pareto-efficient relative to individual interdependent preferences) and (ii) unanimously weakly preferred to the initial market equilibrium. We elicit minimal conditions for meaningful social contract redistribution in this setup, namely, the weighted sums of individual interdependent utility functions, built from arbitrary positive weights, have suitable properties of nonsatiation and inequality aversion; individuals have diverging views on redistribution, in some suitable sense, at (inclusive) distributive optima; and the initial market equilibrium is not a distributive optimum. We show that the relative interior of the set of social contract allocations is then a simply connected smooth manifold of dimension n - 1. We also show that the distributive liberal social contract rules out transfer paradoxes in Arrow-Debreu social systems. We show, finally, that the liberal social contract yields a norm of collective action for the optimal provision of any pure public good. Copyright © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..

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Chapter 5 The Economic Theory of Gift-Giving: Perfect Substitutability of Transfers and Redistribution of Wealth

Cited by 10 publications

References 120 publications

Not All Incentives Wash Out the Warm Glow: The Case of Blood Donation Revisited

Not All Incentives Wash Out the Warm Glow: The Case of Blood Donation Revisited

The Gift and Pay-What-You-Want Pricing

Regular Distributive Efficiency and the Distributive Liberal Social Contract

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