Characterizing best–worst voting systems in the scoring context

García-Lapresta, José Luis; Marley, A. A. J.; Martínez-Panero, Miguel

doi:10.1007/s00355-009-0417-1

Cited by 27 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 17 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Its conception is similar to that of the Hare rule, also known as alternative vote (where the alternative with the fewest first positions is sequentially withdrawn). It is also related to the most used (and criticized) voting system: plurality rule (see Laslier and Congar and Merlin). The midrange is related to the basic 1 ‐best‐ 1 ‐worst voting rule (see García‐Lapresta et al Remark There can exist a unique “translation” between weighting vectors and normalized scoring vectors.…”

Section: The Aggregation Processmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, it can be understood as a flexible scoring rule following the extended framework proposed by Baharad and Nitzan. 14 h Best-worst voting rules were introduced and axiomatically characterized in the scoring context by García-Lapresta et al 31 of the triangle, ( 2 3 , 1 3 ), corresponds to the Borda rule; and the segment connecting (0,0) and (1,1) corresponds to the set of best-worst voting rules.…”

Section: Scoring Rules As Positional Voting Rulesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Best‐worst voting rules were introduced and axiomatically characterized in the scoring context by García‐Lapresta et al …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Positional Voting Rules Generated by Aggregation Functions and the Role of Duplication

García-Lapresta

Martínez-Panero

2017

Int. J. Intell. Syst.

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, we consider a typical voting situation where a group of agents show their preferences over a set of alternatives. Under our approach, such preferences are codified into individual positional values which can be aggregated in several ways through particular functions, yielding positional voting rules and providing a social result in each case. We show that scoring rules belong to such class of positional voting rules. But if we focus our interest on OWA operators as aggregation functions, other well-known voting systems naturally appear. In particular, we determine those ones verifying duplication (i.e., clone irrelevance) and present a proposal of an overall social result provided by them.

show abstract

Section: The Aggregation Processmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Scoring Rules As Positional Voting Rulesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Positional Voting Rules Generated by Aggregation Functions and the Role of Duplication

García-Lapresta

Martínez-Panero

2017

Int. J. Intell. Syst.

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Scoring ranking rules 2 [32,57,67,102,104,169] constitute a large family of ranking rules based on positional information, with as most prominent examples plurality [153], the Borda count [18], veto [7,141] (also known as anti-plurality) and best-worst voting systems [66]. A scoring ranking rule assigns a score to each of the k candidates based on the positions at which the candidate is ranked by each voter.…”

Section: Scoring Ranking Rulesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As pointed out by Merlin [97], Arrow's theorem [3] can be understood as an axiomatization of dictatorship. Characterizations of the simple majority rule [95], scoring functions [169], best-worst voting systems [66] and other voting rules have been proposed. Characterizing the search for monotonicity is still an open problem that will be addressed in the near future.…”

Section: Axiomatic Social Choice Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%