2007
DOI: 10.1016/j.envhaz.2007.09.002
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Charity hazard—A real hazard to natural disaster insurance?

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 178 publications
(104 citation statements)
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References 30 publications
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“…In terms of moral hazard effects, private flood mitigation could be negatively correlated with the expectation of financial damage coverage by (a) an insurance company or (b) some government relief payments -the latter is often referred to as 'charity hazard' and is a special case of moral hazard (Raschky and Weck-Hannemann 2007). The effect of being insured against flood damage on private mitigation is not often analysed.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In terms of moral hazard effects, private flood mitigation could be negatively correlated with the expectation of financial damage coverage by (a) an insurance company or (b) some government relief payments -the latter is often referred to as 'charity hazard' and is a special case of moral hazard (Raschky and Weck-Hannemann 2007). The effect of being insured against flood damage on private mitigation is not often analysed.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One main argument is that small probability events are overall ignored or potential damages are broadly underestimated by decision makers (Kunreuther 1984;Kunreuther et al 1978). Other explanations argue that the expectation of emergency relief is responsible for a low private demand (Raschky and Weck-Hannemann 2007).…”
Section: Implications For Uncertain Climate Response Measuresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This has contributed to develop the individuals' tendency not to insure or take any other mitigation measures, highlighting a problem known in literature as charity hazard or forgiveness money [24] [63].…”
Section: The Role Of the Italian State After Past Disasters And The Gmentioning
confidence: 99%