This paper contains an empirical analysis of income tax noncompliance in Switzerland, based on the standard model of tax evasion. Noncompliance is found to be positively related to the marginal tax burden and negatively to the probability of audit, though the latter impact is only weak. There is no evidence of a significant deterrent effect of the penalty tax. The extended model reveals that noncompliance is positively related to inflation. Finally, noncompliance is significantly lower when citizens/taxpayers have direct control over government budgets, whereas the opposite holds when there is no such control.* The paper has benefitted from useful comments by Rodney Beard, Albert Hart, Susanne Krebs, Agnar Sandmo, and participants at various conferences. Werner Pommerehne unexpectedly died of a heart attack on October 8, 1994. With him I lost a most creative teacher, an excellent co-author and a very good friend. This manuscript has been written and revised before his death.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract After the flooding in 2002 European governments provided billions of Euros of financial assistance to their citizens. Although there is no doubt that solidarity and some sort of assistance is reasonable, the question arises why these damages were not sufficiently insured. One explanation why individuals reject to obtain insurance cover against natural hazards is that they anticipate governmental and private aid. This problem became to be known as "charity hazard". The present paper gives an economic analysis of the institutional arrangements on the market for natural disaster insurances focusing on imperfections caused by governmental financial relief. It provides a theoretical explanation why charity hazard is a problem on the market for natural disaster insurances, in the way that it acts as an obstacle for the proper diffusion and therefore the establishment of natural hazard insurances. This paper provides a review of the scientific discussion on charity hazard, provides a theoretical analysis and points out the existing empirical problems regarding this issue. Terms of use: Documents in

This paper provides an overview of the existing systems of natural hazard insurance in Europe, their structural characteristics and peculiarities. It also discusses the diffi culties of adaptation of these systems to climate change and the growing number of natural disasters. Using Germany, Austria and Switzerland as examples, the paper demonstrates that based on the status quo, the Swiss monopoly insurance system, which is embedded within a unique direct voting environment, is most able to reduce micro-and macroeconomic disruptions resulting from natural hazards. 'Change in diversity' is seen to offer the best chance to arrive at insurance systems that are prepared for climate change while being adapted to local particularities. Efforts to harmonize national and regional systems as well as top-down EU initiatives are argued to be inadequate.

Abstract. Decision-making for protection measures against natural hazards entails major complexities for final decision makers. The issue in question does not only implicate a variety of criteria that need to be considered but also scarce financial resources make the allocation decision a difficult task. Furthermore, these decisions appear to be multidisciplinary in nature. Stakeholders from experts over politicians and the public are among the affected parties in making and dealing with the consequences of such decisions. In order to capture the complexity that arises when incorporating the varieties of interests as well as impacts protection measures have on the environment, the economy and society, transparent and multidisciplinary decision support techniques are needed. This paper looks at how Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA), a tool already applied to decisions concerning protective measures, and Multi Criteria Analysis (MCA), even though new to the field as such but already successfully practiced in other environmental areas, perform according to the abovementioned criteria. A conceptual overview of the methodologies will be given along with a discussion of the respective strengths and weaknesses. Looking at past applications, this overview gives an analysis about the potential of socio economics in its contribution to natural hazard research.

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