Children's Understanding of Preexisting Differences in Knowledge and Belief

Miller, Scott A.

doi:10.1006/drev.1999.0501

Cited by 46 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 110 publications

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“…Psychometric Evaluation of the PCToMM-E ToM is concerned with the understanding of thoughts and feelings and all mental states in one's self and others as well as the understanding of similarities and differences in mental states across different targets (Miller, 2000). The notion of ToM is broad, multifaceted (Astington, 2005) and subsumes or overlaps with constructs that include, but are not limited to, metarepresentation, pretense (Leslie, 1987), the ability to deceive (e.g., Sodian & Frith, 1992;Sodian, Taylor, Harris, & Perner, 1992), the mental-physical distinction (Baron-Cohen, 1989a), desire and intention (Astington, 1999(Astington, , 2001Wellman & Bartsch, 1988), distinctions between appearance and reality (Baron-Cohen, 1989a;Flavell, Green & Flavell, 1986), the causes of emotions in general (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1991), the notion that seeing leads to knowing (Leslie & Frith, 1988;Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989), second-order thinking (i.e., understanding embedded mental states; e.g., what Laura thinks Patty thinks; Baron-Cohen,1989b), visual perspective-taking (Leslie & Frith, 1988), affective recognition (Baron-Cohen, 2003;Prior, Dahlstrom & Squires, 1990), empathy (Baron-Cohen, 2003), and the understanding and production of mental state terms (Kazak et al, 1997;Tager-Flusberg, 1992) and speech acts (Astington, 1988;Searle, 1969).…”

Section: Parents As Experts Of Children's Knowledge and Abilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond False Beliefs: The Development and Psychometric Evaluation of the Perceptions of Children’s Theory of Mind Measure—Experimental Version (PCToMM-E)

Hutchins

Bonazinga

Prelock

et al. 2007

J Autism Dev Disord

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The Perceptions of Children's Theory of Mind Measure (Experimental version; PCToMM-E) is an informant measure designed to tap children's theory of mind competence. Study one evaluated the measure when completed by primary caregivers of children with autism spectrum disorder. Scores demonstrated high test-retest reliability and correlated with verbal mental age and ToM task battery performance. No ceiling effects were observed. In addition, caregivers accurately predicted their children's ToM task battery performance. In study two the scores of primary caregivers of typically developing children demonstrated high test-retest reliability and distinguished children on the basis of age and developmental status. Ceiling effects were not evident until late childhood. The utility of the PCToMM-E and directions for future research are discussed.

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Section: Parents As Experts Of Children's Knowledge and Abilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond False Beliefs: The Development and Psychometric Evaluation of the Perceptions of Children’s Theory of Mind Measure—Experimental Version (PCToMM-E)

Hutchins

Bonazinga

Prelock

et al. 2007

J Autism Dev Disord

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“…In his false belief scenarios, Bradmetz (1999) did the reverse by presenting the action of the protagonist without giving the latter's mental state to the child. 11 It is not clear how these variations affect children's performance, but, as suggested by Miller (2000), researchers should develop more complex false belief tasks in which the scenarios provide a wider scope of contexts for evaluating children's false belief understanding. This also applies to their understanding of epistemic states.…”

Section: Limitationsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Children's Understanding of Behavioral Consequences of Epistemic States: A Comparison of Knowledge, Ignorance, and False Belief

Deneault

2015

The Journal of Genetic Psychology

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The author addressed the issue of the simultaneity of false belief and knowledge understanding by investigating children's ability to predict the behavioral consequences of knowledge, ignorance, and false belief. The second aim of the study was to explore the role of counterfactuals in knowledge understanding. Ninety-nine (99) children, age 3-7 years old, completed the unexpected transfer task and a newly designed task in which a protagonist experienced 1 of the following 4 situations: knowing a fact, not knowing a fact, knowing a procedure, and not knowing a procedure. The results showed that factual ignorance was as difficult as false belief for the children, whereas the other conditions were all easier than false belief, suggesting that the well-known lag between ignorance and false belief may be partly methodologically based. The results provide support for a common underlying conceptual system for both knowing and believing, and evidence of the role of counterfactual reasoning in the development of epistemic state understanding. Methodological variations of the new task are proposed for future research.

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“…Knowledge and beliefs are interrelated concepts, which both belong to the broad domain of emotional and cognitive concepts studied in a 'theories of mind' perspective (aside from 'desires', 'emotions', 'pretence'…). In a paper published in 1992, Montgomery proposed a summary of the contributions relating to the nature of knowledge (and beliefs), taken from papers about theories of mind (see also , Miller 2000). Montgomery was therefore the first to propose the term folk epistemology to describe that part of folk psychology (i.e.…”

Section: Theories Of Mindmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…In most of the developmental models of personal epistemology, this line of research refers to a progression ranging from a vision of knowledge as located outside the person and transmitted by a sensorial experience or by an external authority, to a vision in which the person is viewed as an active constructor of meaning (Hofer 2004b). Source of knowledge is a field widely investigated in research relating to theories of mind (Montgomery 1992;Miller 2000). In some experiments (e.g.…”

Section: Personal Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Theories of mind and personal epistemology: their interrelation and connection with the concept of metacognition

Fagnant

Crahay

2010

Eur J Psychol Educ

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This paper seeks to highlight the links and discrepancies between three contemporary theoretical fields. The first part is devoted to theories of mind and personal epistemology. Both fields deal with naïve theories relating to the nature of knowledge and can be integrated within the concept of folk epistemology (Kitchener New Ideas Psychol 20:89-105, 2002). We argue that analyzing both domains from a developmental perspective may provide evidence for the origins of epistemological beliefs and the reasons for their evolution. The second part of the paper extends the discussion to the concept of metacognition and to its potential links with the two previously mentioned fields. In the past, theories of mind and metacognition have mainly developed as independent fields, but recent studies have highlighted a possible developmental lineage between them that needs further investigation. As the influence of the procedural component of metacognition (the regulation process) seems obvious in the personal epistemology perspective, we suggest that conducting more in situ studies will enable us to deepen our understanding of the links between the multiple components of the epistemological perspective and the reasons for epistemic change.Résumé Cet article vise à éclairer les liens et divergences possibles entre trois courants théoriques contemporains. La première partie est consacrée aux théories de l'esprit et à l'épistémologie personnelle. Les deux courants s'intéressent aux théories naïves relatives à la connaissance et peuvent être intégrés sous le concept d'épistémologie populaire (folk epistemology, Kitchener New Ideas Psychol 20:89-105, 2002). Nous défendons l'idée selon laquelle analyser les deux domaines dans une perspective développementale permet de Eur J Psychol Educ (2011) 26:257-271 mieux cerner les origines des croyances épistémiques et les raisons de leur évolution. La deuxième partie de l'article étend la discussion au concept de métacognition et envisage de possibles liaisons avec les deux champs susmentionnés. Par le passé, les théories de l'esprit et la métacognition se sont développées essentiellement comme des champs de recherche indépendants. Des études récentes ont permis d'éclairer une possible continuité dével-oppementale entre ces champs, ouvrant dès lors la voie à de nouvelles investigations. Dans la mesure où la composante procédurale de la métacognition (le processus de régulation) semble assez clairement présente dans le champ de l'épistémologie personnelle, nous suggérons de conduire davantage de recherche in situ en vue d'approfondir notre compréhension des liens entre les multiples composantes de la perspective épistémologique ainsi que des éléments explicatifs des changements épistémiques.

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Children's Understanding of Preexisting Differences in Knowledge and Belief

Cited by 46 publications

References 110 publications

Beyond False Beliefs: The Development and Psychometric Evaluation of the Perceptions of Children’s Theory of Mind Measure—Experimental Version (PCToMM-E)

Beyond False Beliefs: The Development and Psychometric Evaluation of the Perceptions of Children’s Theory of Mind Measure—Experimental Version (PCToMM-E)

Children's Understanding of Behavioral Consequences of Epistemic States: A Comparison of Knowledge, Ignorance, and False Belief

Theories of mind and personal epistemology: their interrelation and connection with the concept of metacognition

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