Theories of mind and personal epistemology: their interrelation and connection with the concept of metacognition

Abstract

This paper seeks to highlight the links and discrepancies between three contemporary theoretical fields. The first part is devoted to theories of mind and personal epistemology. Both fields deal with naïve theories relating to the nature of knowledge and can be integrated within the concept of folk epistemology (Kitchener New Ideas Psychol 20:89-105, 2002). We argue that analyzing both domains from a developmental perspective may provide evidence for the origins of epistemological beliefs and the reasons for their evolution. The second part of the paper extends the discussion to the concept of metacognition and to its potential links with the two previously mentioned fields. In the past, theories of mind and metacognition have mainly developed as independent fields, but recent studies have highlighted a possible developmental lineage between them that needs further investigation. As the influence of the procedural component of metacognition (the regulation process) seems obvious in the personal epistemology perspective, we suggest that conducting more in situ studies will enable us to deepen our understanding of the links between the multiple components of the epistemological perspective and the reasons for epistemic change.Résumé Cet article vise à éclairer les liens et divergences possibles entre trois courants théoriques contemporains. La première partie est consacrée aux théories de l'esprit et à l'épistémologie personnelle. Les deux courants s'intéressent aux théories naïves relatives à la connaissance et peuvent être intégrés sous le concept d'épistémologie populaire (folk epistemology, Kitchener New Ideas Psychol 20:89-105, 2002). Nous défendons l'idée selon laquelle analyser les deux domaines dans une perspective développementale permet de Eur J Psychol Educ (2011) 26:257-271 mieux cerner les origines des croyances épistémiques et les raisons de leur évolution. La deuxième partie de l'article étend la discussion au concept de métacognition et envisage de possibles liaisons avec les deux champs susmentionnés. Par le passé, les théories de l'esprit et la métacognition se sont développées essentiellement comme des champs de recherche indépendants. Des études récentes ont permis d'éclairer une possible continuité dével-oppementale entre ces champs, ouvrant dès lors la voie à de nouvelles investigations. Dans la mesure où la composante procédurale de la métacognition (le processus de régulation) semble assez clairement présente dans le champ de l'épistémologie personnelle, nous suggérons de conduire davantage de recherche in situ en vue d'approfondir notre compréhension des liens entre les multiples composantes de la perspective épistémologique ainsi que des éléments explicatifs des changements épistémiques.

Evaluating the reflexive practices in a learning experience

“…Without mentalization, the other is transformed into an object, dehumanized (Allen 2006). Regarding knowledge construction, recent studies also highlighted the relationship between theories of mind and epistemological beliefs (Fagnant and Crahay 2010). Lalonde and Chandler (2002) state in effect that the capacity to appreciate the interpretative nature of knowing needs to encompass an understanding of the interpretative character of the mind.…”

The Current State of Transformative Learning Theory: A Metatheory

“…Metacognition is essentially the thoughts individuals have about their own thought processes (Bromme, Pieschl, & Stahl, 2010). Metacognition overlaps with personal epistemology because it encompasses what individuals know about their own cognitive processes, and their ability to control or adjust those processes, including their personal epistemology (Bromme, Pieschl, & Stahl 2010;Fagnant & Crahay, 2011). Because of this relationship, some scholars believe that metacognition actually regulates epistemological change (Fagnant & Crahay, 2011).…”

“…Metacognition overlaps with personal epistemology because it encompasses what individuals know about their own cognitive processes, and their ability to control or adjust those processes, including their personal epistemology (Bromme, Pieschl, & Stahl 2010;Fagnant & Crahay, 2011). Because of this relationship, some scholars believe that metacognition actually regulates epistemological change (Fagnant & Crahay, 2011). As such, changes in metacognitive processes and structures may facilitate epistemological changes that deeply influence individuals' entire understanding of how they think and perceive their experiences and the world.…”

Epistemic Orientation Short Scale: Development and Validity Evidence in a Sample of Psychotherapists

“…Personal epistemology has been broadly defined as an individual's beliefs about the nature of knowledge and knowing and has become a prominent line of investigation, especially for educational researchers (Greene, Sandoval, & Bråten, 2016;Holma & Hyytinen, 2015). According to Fagnant and Crahay (2011), researchers in this field have combined different theoretical approaches to address mainly questions regarding the certainty and simplicity of knowledge (that is, the nature of knowledge) and the source of knowledge and justification of knowing (that is, the nature of knowing). Methodologically, these issues have been usually assessed using self-report questionnaires intended to measure different dimensions of personal epistemology (Fagnant & Crahay, 2011;Holma & Hyytinen, 2015;Muis et al, 2015;.…”

“…According to Fagnant and Crahay (2011), researchers in this field have combined different theoretical approaches to address mainly questions regarding the certainty and simplicity of knowledge (that is, the nature of knowledge) and the source of knowledge and justification of knowing (that is, the nature of knowing). Methodologically, these issues have been usually assessed using self-report questionnaires intended to measure different dimensions of personal epistemology (Fagnant & Crahay, 2011;Holma & Hyytinen, 2015;Muis et al, 2015;.…”