2017
DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2017.1408674
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China's economic slowdown: implications for Beijing's institutional power and global governance role

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Cited by 18 publications
(10 citation statements)
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References 67 publications
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“…Regime Shifting is a significant approach in several respects, such as: China's promotion of some regional political and trade regimes that exclude Western countries and target developing countries; the enhancement of overland transport routes to reduce the dependence on maritime choke-points in the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea; China's emphasis on the guidelines of respect for sovereignty in South-South cooperation that is distinguished from enforcement by the West; and efforts to revive the Eurasian culture memory. Therefore, we can conclude that China plays the roles of both rule taker and rule breaker when implementing the BRI, which accords with several studies that claim that rising powers are support some aspects of the current global order and contest others (Jones, 2020;Loke, 2018;Paradise, 2016;Yuan, 2018). However, the role played by China goes beyond the binary outlook of rule taker and rule breaker.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 85%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Regime Shifting is a significant approach in several respects, such as: China's promotion of some regional political and trade regimes that exclude Western countries and target developing countries; the enhancement of overland transport routes to reduce the dependence on maritime choke-points in the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea; China's emphasis on the guidelines of respect for sovereignty in South-South cooperation that is distinguished from enforcement by the West; and efforts to revive the Eurasian culture memory. Therefore, we can conclude that China plays the roles of both rule taker and rule breaker when implementing the BRI, which accords with several studies that claim that rising powers are support some aspects of the current global order and contest others (Jones, 2020;Loke, 2018;Paradise, 2016;Yuan, 2018). However, the role played by China goes beyond the binary outlook of rule taker and rule breaker.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 85%
“…However, the AIIB offers the world's first infrastructure-dedicated multilateral development bank (MDB). The approach of these financial platforms becomes more complicated because they are targeted at infrastructure construction, which is a vacuum issue because of a lack of attention, sufficient funding and effective institutions (Loke, 2018;Yuan, 2018). Except for differences in power distribution and project selection with existing financial platforms, the MDBs initiated by China are identical to existing financial institutions in their governance, such as operational policy, sovereign-backed loans and guarantee pricing policy, procurement policy, information policy, and environmental and social framework (Wilson, 2019).…”
Section: Building a New Type Of Financial Platformsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Either it refers to the power of institutions , such as international organizations, state institutions, companies, churches, etc., which can be used to exercise control over people (Marshal, Curry, & Pacelle, 2014; Sieberer, 2011), or it is applied to describe a state’s control of international institutions . In the latter case, institutional power enables states to exert indirect influence on the behaviour of member states through the institutions’ formal and informal rules (Choi, 2013; Loke, 2017; Thompson, 2013).…”
Section: Conceptualizing Institutional Powermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the early 1970s, China joined the UN system, but remained relatively inactive for the following 25 or so years. It was only much more recently that China began taking an active interest in existing global governance institutions, as well as establishing new ones (Shambaugh, 2013, p. 125;Loke, 2017). This general trend manifests in China's participation in the institutions established to govern nuclear technologies as well.…”
Section: Existing Perspectives On China and Global Governancementioning
confidence: 99%