China’s Evolving Civil-Military Relations: Creeping Guojiahua

Abstract

China has experienced unprecedented economic, political, and social changes during the past twenty-five years, and in 2002–2003 just witnessed a sweeping turnover of political and military elites. Civil-military relations in China are undergoing a major transfor-mation, but experts tend to disagree on what the most important trend is. This article contends that the most significant transformation underway in Chinese civil-military relations is statification or nationalization—what the Chinese call guojiahua. The People’s Liberation Army is being transformed from a party army into a party-state army. Other trends include continued, weakly institutionalized civilian control of the armed forces; civil-military relations no longer being merely about party-army relations; and military professionalization without depoliticization. While the process of creeping guojiahua is likely to be rocky in the near-to-mid terms, the trend augurs well for long-term political change in China, particularly the prospects for successful democratization.

History and Future Perceptive of Civil–military Relations in China

“…On the other hand, increasing professionalism is a double‐edged sword (SIPRI for the Media 2020). While it distances the military from daily political ties, it also promotes a greater feeling of autonomy, corporate responsibility, and a need to intervene when vital interests are threatened and, if possible, coupled with the ability to do so (Scobell 2005). While exceptions to the standard exist, political work and education reduction have resulted from enhanced military professionalization.…”

Tug of War: Government-Military Power Struggles and International Conflict

“…4 In practice, scholars often debate the existence of strong civilian control over the military in a particular state; even when it exists, it may not completely preclude independent activity by the military. For example, Scobell (2005) [228] calls civilian control over the military in China in the early 2000s "weakly institutionalized." Feige (2014) suggests that, "[i]ncidents such as the surprise stealth fighter test during former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' visit in 2011, or the 2007 anti-satellite test, are prime examples of the CCP's leadership being seemingly unaware of what its military is doing."…”

Military Culture and Chinese Export Controls

“…''Most experts,'' declares a contemporary U.S. analyst, ''agree that other than the CCP,'' the military is ''the most central institution in the PRC.'' 55 Despite the political and economic modernization of the past two decades, the Communist Party continues to depend on the military to ensure its continued supremacy in the Chinese political system Áa fact that the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident brought home to CCP leaders. 56 Military officers ''command the forces which may be used to determine the outcome of an elite power struggle, displace rebellious local figures, put down a mass uprising, or even carry out a coup,'' observes one contemporary analyst.…”