China's strategic distastes for Korea in the Indo‐Pacific strategy: Major concerns and countermeasures

Abstract

China sees South Korea's full access will perfect the Indo-Pacific strategy, dealing a detrimental blow to its national security interests for three reasons, geography, economics, and defense. The Indo-Pacific strategy is also a strategy based on network building. However, the inherent nature of the network limits the membership to allies, "likeminded states," and supporters to the rule-based order.While Korea still holds reservations about making a fullfledged commitment to the strategy, China is to do its utmost including coercive measures to prevent it from joining it. In this light, the article will first analyze the reasons why China opposes Korea joining the strategy. China's strategic interest against the Indo-Pacific strategy will be inferred to substantiate its objection to Korea's participation. The article will also explain the imperatives for Korea to join the strategy. It will conclude with some remarks that can help the United States. induce Korea's commitment and vice versa.

Australian perspective on engaging with South Korea in the Indo‐Pacific

“…First, the geopolitical limitations and geoeconomic relations with China make South Korea hesitant to participate in the US‐led mini‐ or multilateral security cooperation, if the South Korean government determines that these architectures would be seen as offending or containment of China (Choo, 2023; Flake, 2020; Park, 2021; B. Paterson, 2021). Kyle Springer, Senior Analyst from Perth USAsia Centre, analyzes that “South Korea remains preoccupied by its own survival and security concerns on the peninsula which constrain it from taking a view regional “ (emphasis added), particularly whereupon the US alliance system and the US‐led FOIP concept are centered (Springer, 2020, p. 7).…”

“…First, the geopolitical limitations and geoeconomic relations with China make South Korea hesitant to participate in the US-led mini-or multilateral security cooperation, if the South Korean government determines that these architectures would be seen as offending or containment of China (Choo, 2023;Flake, 2020;Park, 2021;B. Paterson, 2021).…”

A relational approach to Indo‐Pacific strategies: South Korea's role in a networked regional architecture

“…Still others are tightening relations with Indo‐Pacific partners beyond the United States as attested by emerging trilaterals (e.g., India, Australia, United Kingdom; India, Japan, Australia). In contrast, some actors such as ASEAN remain ambivalent, or opposed altogether to an Indo‐Pacific framing such as China, as Jaewoo Choo (2023) argues in his paper. How do different actors perceive South Korea's role in the region? Whereas some countries may see South Korea in the Indo‐Pacific as primarily an economic rather than a significant strategic player, others may see Seoul playing a larger defense role.…”

“…Still others are tightening relations with Indo‐Pacific partners beyond the United States as attested by emerging trilaterals (e.g., India, Australia, United Kingdom; India, Japan, Australia). In contrast, some actors such as ASEAN remain ambivalent, or opposed altogether to an Indo‐Pacific framing such as China, as Jaewoo Choo (2023) argues in his paper.…”

South Korea in the ASEAN‐centered regional network

“…In this context, the revival of the Quad in 2017 accompanied by the rise of the Indo‐Pacific narrative had initially prompted some concerns within ASEAN (Stromseth, 2021). A part of the apprehension stemmed from the perception that the Indo‐Pacific concept and its associated arrangements were meant to constrain China's rise, and that they would catalyze the deterioration of Sino‐US relations which would raise tensions in the region (see Choo, 2023). Another part of the concern arose from the awareness that the emergence of the Quad and the Indo‐Pacific heralded a more prominent role for non‐ASEAN countries, such as Australia, India, Japan and the United States, in the regional architecture (see Cooper, 2023; J. Kim, 2023; Koga, 2023; Panda, 2023).…”