China-Venezuelan Economic Relations: Hedging Venezuelan Bets with Chinese Characteristics

Kaplan, Stephen B.; Penfold, Michael

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3459035

Cited by 15 publications

(21 citation statements)

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“…There are tentative signs that CHEXIM and CDB's enthusiasm for riskier overseas loans may be diminishing (Kaplan and Penfold, 2019). Nevertheless, the last two decades have witnessed the worldwide growth of a parallel network of China-run development finance which now overlaps -somewhat uneasily -with the incumbent US-centred system.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hidden in Plain Sight: Chinese Development Finance in Central and Eastern Europe

Jepson¹

2021

Development and Change

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China's bilateral loans have been the subject of much controversy. Most recently, an influential paper by Horn, Reinhart and Trebesch claimed that a large proportion of Chinese overseas lending is 'hidden' and not reported to any of the institutions which monitor global financial flows. This article examines this proposition in relation to Central and Eastern Europe, through an analysis of official Chinese lending to four countries (Belarus, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Ukraine). It finds that the most recent estimates of emerging markets' and developing economies' debts to China tend to be exaggerated, at least with respect to Central and Eastern Europe, and so are claims of hidden loans. In line with trends elsewhere, in three of the four cases private capital market debts outweigh debts to China. Although a lack of centralized data sources makes it challenging to form a full picture of Chinese lending, there seems to be less secrecy involved than is often suggested. Concerns remain regarding the apparent readiness of Chinese creditors to finance projects of dubious viability, as well as related issues of waste, corruption and environmental impact.The author is grateful to the Hallsworth Endowment and Leverhulme Trust for partially funding this research. This article is partly based on work conducted in association with COST Action CA18215 -China in Europe Research Network -supported by COST (European Cooperation in Science and Technology). An earlier version was presented at a workshop held at COST, Brussels, 7 November 2019. The author is grateful to the workshop's participants for their feedback, and to the referees of Development and Change for their comments on subsequent drafts.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hidden in Plain Sight: Chinese Development Finance in Central and Eastern Europe

Jepson¹

2021

Development and Change

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“…Traditionally this relationship was managed with the typical presidents' visits, bilateral trade and financing agreements (Provaggi, 2013;Sun, 2012). It was not until Hugo Chavez took office as Venezuela's president in 1999 that China began to be perceived as a potential business partner that could help Venezuela to gain autonomy from its leading trade partner, the U.S. (Kaplan & Penfold, 2019). Discord between Chavez and the US capitalist model has been documented in multiple outlets; however, the U.S. remained the main oil importer from Venezuela for many years during the Chavez administration.…”

Section: The China-venezuela Joint Fundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Huawei in Venezuela: a review of 2006–2019

Baldo

Vail

Seidel

2021

REGE

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PurposeThe aim of this article is to describe Huawei's internationalization process in Venezuela and show how socio-political and economic conditions helped to expedite the company's development in this Latin American nation between 2006 and 2019. Through this internationalization process, Huawei participated in a large technological transition in Venezuelan telecommunications.Design/methodology/approachThis research uses an integrative approach, developing a quasi-case study from a review of the academic literature, contemporary news stories and institutional and practitioner documents.FindingsThe review indicates that Huawei was engaged in business with the Venezuelan phone company before its renationalization. Secondly, Huawei's internationalization was a beneficiary of the increased relations between the Venezuelan and Chinese governments, mainly through “oil for loans/goods” agreements. Lastly, this internationalization process includes wholly owned subsidiaries, direct export, greenfield and government joint ventures.Practical implicationsThis research provides an understanding to other firms and strategists about the benefits of strong bilateral economic relationships between home and host countries.Originality/valueThis paper is among the first academic articles that describe the internationalization process of Huawei in Venezuela. Considering the host country's changing political and economic conditions during the last 20 years, such research may provide a perspective for considering other Chinese business expansions in Venezuela and Latin America.

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“…This is just one more example of China's “debt‐trap‐diplomacy.” That is not the vision and practice that African and Latin American nations expect from a business and political partner. China's vision and practices in both continents reflect old business and political practices that have kept both regions hostage of totalitarian regimes and high levels of corruption (Badri‐Maharaj, 2016; Dreyer, 2019; Kaplan & Penfold, 2019; Yan, 2018).…”

Section: Implications Of China's Increasing Defense Interaction With Latin America and Africamentioning

confidence: 99%

China's diversification strategy in Latin American and African markets: Defense software and hardware exports

Gouvea

Kapelianis

Terra

2021

Thunderbird Intl Bus Rev

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In the past two decades, China has become a strategic economic partner for both Latin American and African nations. China's economic global relevance is translating via its “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)” into massive amounts of foreign trade, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), loans, and aid for both regions. Recently, China has added a national security and defense dimension to its BRI relationship with both regions. China's global strategic economic, geopolitical, and global defense goals are being expressed in its global “Road and Belt” power initiatives and strategies. This paper explores an additional dimension of China's BRI initiative: its role in both regions' defense industries and national security environments. China is increasingly using its trade and investment leverage with both regions to unbalance their defense choices and strategic defense relationships. China's increasing interactions with African and Latin American countries poses a number of geopolitical implications for both the United States and Western European countries.

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China-Venezuelan Economic Relations: Hedging Venezuelan Bets with Chinese Characteristics

Cited by 15 publications

References 0 publications

Hidden in Plain Sight: Chinese Development Finance in Central and Eastern Europe

Hidden in Plain Sight: Chinese Development Finance in Central and Eastern Europe

Huawei in Venezuela: a review of 2006–2019

China's diversification strategy in Latin American and African markets: Defense software and hardware exports

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