The acceleration of authoritarianism in Venezuela since 2004, together with Hugo Chávez's reelection in 2006, cannot be explained easily with functional theories. Instead, we focus on political opportunities: specifically, economic resources at the state's disposal together with weakened institutions of representation helped crowd out the opposition. We show how clientelism and electoral authoritarianism feed each other. Together with deliberate strategies of polarization, impunity, and job discrimination, lavish spending has allowed the state to mobilize majorities and emerge undefeatable at the polls. This invincibility is, paradoxically, the reason that the Venezuelan state has become an unreliable force for promoting democracy.

During the last decade many Latin American countries have changed their constitutions to allow presidential reelection. This is a significant shift from the previous standard surrounding constitutional design, prevalent in the 1980s, which favored limiting consecutive reelection. This paper explores whether this new trend towards presidential reelection is undermining the quality of democracy by expanding incumbency advantage, or is instead improving the accountability of presidents seeking reelection. To assess this debate, we first examine the evolution of the different rules governing presidential reelection in Latin America and look at the frequency and manner in which incumbent presidents in the region have tried to change these rules. Next, using our own database of 125 presidential elections in eighteen countries between 1953 and 2012, we analyze election outcomes. We find that the right to reelection increases the electoral advantage of incumbents to the detriment of accountability. We conclude by offering some possible institutional responses that might help ameliorate the incumbent’s advantage.

No abstract

No abstract

ReSUMen el estado de la democracia en venezuela combina prácticas electorales débilmente institucionalizadas aunque relativamente libres y limpias pero con claros rasgos autoritarios: la falta de autonomía de los poderes Judicial y Legislativo frente a un ejecutivo con atribuciones extraordinarias; el desarrollo de complejas dinámicas de centralización del poder hacia la figura del presidente; el acceso irrestricto a los recursos petroleros por parte del gobierno federal; la ausencia de una prensa imparcial e independiente y la pérdida de transparencia en el gobierno, entre otros. Las anormalidades constitucionales en el referéndum de 2009 (que permite el surgimiento del único sistema presidencial en la región con reelección ilimitada) sugieren además que incluso la democracia electoral está siendo socavada.Palabras clave: venezuela, democracia, presidencialismo, referéndum, descentralización. ABSTRACT The state of democracy in Venezuela combines relatively fair, free, and electoral procedures but with distinct authoritarian features: the lack of autonomy in the Judicial and Legislative powers vis-à-vis an Executive with extraordinary attributions; the development of complex dynamics of centralization of power by the President; the free access to oil revenues by the federal government;the absence of an independent and impartial press and the loss of transparency in the government, among others. Moreover, the abnormalities in the 2009 referendum (that has allowed the emergence of the only presidential system in the region without term limits) suggest that even electoral democracy is being undermined in the country.