Choice and constraint in budget-making

Abstract

A theory of the budgetary process within public resource allocation has to recognize that decision rules may vary over time and program. Our findings based on a net. econometric approach indicate that various different decision mechanisms operate in different categories of public resource allocation. Variation over time is particularly difficult to accommodate within the incrementalist approach as incremental decision rules imply structural stability over time. We find the opposite to be true of the programs analysed.A model of the public expenditure process has to take choice into account to a larger extent. The attempt to make budget-making a function of constraints violates the occurrence of shiftpoints that is typical of the data. The existence of a base and the resort to mechanical rules for the derivation of the yearly increments implies a deterministic interpretatior~ of budgetary behavior. Budgets are made in choice processes where the principal actors employ various decision rules meaning that budget-making is more voluntaristic than deterministic. The choice rules employed for the derivation of requests and appropriations are not mechanistic decision rules.