Choice of Routes in Congested Traffic Networks: Experimental Tests of the Braess Paradox

Rapoport, Anatol; Kugler, Tamar; Dugar, Subhasish; Gisches, Eyran J.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.758059

Cited by 29 publications

(66 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…However, Table 1 shows that under the constraint of total path utilization, in equilibrium each player type splits her flow as evenly as possible. 4 Counter-balancing the presentation of Parts I and II in their study, Rapoport et al (2009) reported no order effects. 5 When expressed in terms of cost of travel, the move from the basic network in Part I of game G(U18) to the augmented network in Part II increases the equilibrium cost from 122 to 144 or by 18%.…”

Section: Conclusion and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 80%

“…They also constructed and experimentally studied an augmented network by adding a single cost-free link that connected the two links with the variable costs. Rapoport et al (2009) reported that the mean route choices in the basic network converged very quickly to equilibrium. However, it took their subjects all 40 rounds to choose the new route in the augmented network that connects the two variablecost links and consequently abandon the two "old" routes in the basic network.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, players could have switched between 0 and 49 times when playing each network. Evidence from previous studies suggests that players who switch frequently tend to obtain lower payoff (e.g., Rapoport et al 2008Rapoport et al , 2009. We counted 6 for each subject separately the frequency of route switches over all 50 rounds of game G(U18), and then correlated individual frequencies of switches with individual payoff.…”

Section: Payoffmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Distributed Decisions in Networks: Laboratory Study of Routing Splittable Flow

Rapoport

Gisches

Mak

2014

Production and Operations Management

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We study network games in which users choose routes in computerized networks susceptible to congestion. In the “unsplittable” condition, route choices are completely unregulated, players are symmetric, each player controls a single unit of flow and chooses a single origin–destination (O–D) path. In the “splittable” condition, which is the main focus of this study, route choices are partly regulated, players are asymmetric, each player controls multiple units of flow and chooses multiple O–D paths to distribute her fleet. In each condition, users choose routes in two types of network: a basic network with three parallel routes and an augmented network with five routes sharing joint links. We construct and subsequently test equilibrium solutions for each combination of condition and network type, and then propose a Markov revision protocol to account for the dynamics of play. In both conditions, route choice behavior approaches equilibrium and the Braess Paradox is clearly manifested.

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Section: Conclusion and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 80%

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Payoffmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Distributed Decisions in Networks: Laboratory Study of Routing Splittable Flow

Rapoport

Gisches

Mak

2014

Production and Operations Management

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“…We study our new setting in a laboratory experiment and find that, over and above theoretical predictions of BP-type welfare loss, coordination failure among experimental participants lead to further drastic deterioration in welfare upon network augmentation. These developments contribute significantly to a line of behavioral studies on directed networks that are conducive to the BP, such as Rapoport et al (2009), Morgan et al (2009), and Rapoport et al (2014).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The new type of the BP that we study differs markedly from previous BP settings-which only involve negative externalities-because of this new characteristic. In previous BP settings such as Rapoport et al (2009), the BP occurred because the (typically unique) equilibrium changed. Here, it could happen because of coordination failure as a behavioral phenomenon.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Braess Paradox and Coordination Failure in Directed Networks with Mixed Externalities

Mak

Seale

Gisches

et al. 2018

Production and Operations Management

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The Braess Paradox (BP) illustrates an important counterintuitive observation that adding links to a directed transportation network with usage externalities may raise the costs of all users. Research on the BP traditionally focuses on congestible networks. We propose and experimentally test a new and more dramatic version of the BP, where the network exhibits both congestion (negative externalities) and cost‐sharing (positive externalities) characteristics. Our design also involves experimental manipulation of choice observability, where players choose routes simultaneously in one condition and sequentially in the other. We report robust behavioral evidence of the BP in both conditions. In nine of 10 sessions in the basic network, subjects coordinated successfully to achieve the welfare‐maximizing equilibrium. But once the network was augmented with a new link, coordination failure resulted in a major proportion of subjects switching to a new route, resulting in a 37% average increase in individual travel cost across conditions.

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