Choosing Justice in Experimental Democracies with Production

Frohlich, Norman; Oppenheimer, Joe

doi:10.2307/1963529

Cited by 106 publications

(64 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…In experiments by Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1990) the redistribution scheme is determined either exogenously by the experimenters or by the subjects. In the latter case the subjects vote for a redistribution scheme from rich to poor under the veil of ignorance, that is, before knowing one's type and the real effort task to be performed afterward.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

It is Hobbes, not Rousseau: an experiment on voting and redistribution

2011

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We perform an experiment which provides a laboratory replica of some important features of the welfare state. In the experiment, all individuals in a group decide whether to make a costly effort, which produces a random (independent) outcome for each one of them. The group members then vote on whether to redistribute the resulting and commonly known total sum of earnings equally amongst themselves. This game has two equilibria, if played once. In one of them, all players make effort and there is little redistribution. In the other one, there is no effort and nothing to redistribute. A solution to the repeated game allows for redistribution and high effort, sustained by the threat to revert to the worst of these equilibria. Our results show that redistribution with high effort is not sustainable. The main reason for the absence of redistribution is that rich agents do not act differently depending on whether the poor have worked hard or not. The equilibrium in which redistribution may be sustained by the threat of punishing the poor if they do not exert effort is not observed in the experiment. Thus, the explanation of the behavior of the subjects lies in Hobbes, not in Rousseau.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

It is Hobbes, not Rousseau: an experiment on voting and redistribution

2011

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“…5 The possibility that the normative may a¤ect the positive is less well explored. And when normative notions have been investigated, the focus has been on the e¤ect of existing preferences or beliefs on, for instance, selected criteria of justice (see Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1990, and references therein). What has been missing is evidence on whether exposure to moral ideas can change preferences or beliefs, and alter outcomes.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“Do the right thing:” The effects of moral suasion on cooperation

Bó

2014

Journal of Public Economics

120

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The use of moral appeals to a¤ect the behavior of others is pervasive (from the pulpit to ethics classes) but little is known about the e¤ects of moral suasion on behavior. In a series of experiments we study whether moral suasion a¤ects behavior in voluntary contribution games and the mechanisms by which behavior is altered. We …nd that observing a message with a moral standard according to the golden rule or, alternatively, utilitarian philosophy, results in a signi…cant but transitory increase in contributions above the levels observed for subjects that did not receive a message or received a message that advised them to contribute without a moral rationale. When players have the option of punishing each other after the contribution stage, the e¤ect of the moral messages on contributions becomes persistent: punishments and moral messages interact to sustain cooperation. We also investigate the mechanisms through which moral suasion operates and …nd it a¤ects both expectations and preferences.JEL codes: C9, H41.

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“…Furthermore, there is a similar effect (but smaller in size) for r t−1 m , while we do not find this relation for the choice of E. That is, for the P rule, high or medium productivity in the former period triggers the demand for redistribution in the following period, and severely confounds the effect of the current signal. 19 To complete our analysis, let us consider now the FI condition. Table 5 reports the estimation results.…”

Section: Individual Demand For Redistributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Choices for Redistribution and the Veil of Ignorance: Theory and Experimental Evidence

2013

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We provide experimental evidence on the emergence of redistributive societies. Individuals first vote on redistribution by feet and then learn their productivity and invest. We vary the individuals' information about their productivities at the time when they choose a distribution rule and find that there is more redistribution behind a veil of ignorance than under full information. However, the scope of redistribution is less sensitive towards the degree of uncertainty than predicted. For all degrees of uncertainty, we find a coexistence of libertarianism and redistribution as well as incomplete sorting, so that heterogeneous redistribution communities turn out to be sustainable. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL-Code: C910, D020, D630, H240, K000.

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Choosing Justice in Experimental Democracies with Production

Cited by 106 publications

References 16 publications

It is Hobbes, not Rousseau: an experiment on voting and redistribution

It is Hobbes, not Rousseau: an experiment on voting and redistribution

“Do the right thing:” The effects of moral suasion on cooperation

Strategic Choices for Redistribution and the Veil of Ignorance: Theory and Experimental Evidence

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