Chord: Thwarting Relay Attacks Among Near Field Communications

Ji, Yafei; Xia, Luning; Lin, Jingqiang; Wang, Qiongxiao; Lei, Lingguang; Song, Lingnan

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-14234-6_18

Cited by 1 publication

(2 citation statements)

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“…Authentication with a stationary phone may indicate that a relay attack is occurring. Other works have utilized microphone signals [18], [22], sensor data [23], [24], and localization data [19], [20]. Contextualization does not work with every device (e.g., lacking sensors), is vulnerable to spoofing [19], [25], and may yield high false-positives if the context is irrelevant or inapplicable.…”

Section: Relevant Work and Motivationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This would be detected and rejected in the AF detection phase. The second and third scenarios occur when the attacker sends a random response or when the attacker replays a previous legitimate authenticated message M 1 (22). In both scenarios, if the attacker does not have the secret session key, then when the verifier performs the decryption in the reveal phase, it will decrypt uniformly random and uncorrelated samples for p ′ 1 , R ′ 1 ∈ D ⊂ C, assuming a proper encryption algorithm (e.g., AES) was used in the reveal phase.…”

Section: Challenge-response Authentica-tionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Relay Attack Detection using OFDM Channel-Fingerprinting

Abubaker,

Gong

2024

Preprint

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Decode-and-forward and amplify-and-forward relay attacks are a powerful tool for defeating challenge-response authentication protocols. Current solutions for detecting these relay attacks utilize round-trip time distance-bounding. Unfortunately, secure implementations of distance-bounding require dedicated ultra-wideband hardware that only provide low data rates and operate at relatively short distances. In this paper we propose two novel symmetric-key challenge-response authentication protocols that can detect either a decode-andforward relay attack or prevent a decode-and-forward and detect an amplify-and-forward relay attack. Both protocols utilize the channel state information in a far-field communication system to perform the detection. The first protocol utilizes the correlation of the adjusted channel frequency response to detect decode-and-forward relay attacks. The second protocol prevents decode-and-forward relay attacks through the use of randomized pilots, and detects amplify-and-forward relay attacks by classifying the distribution of the channel frequency response that is caused by multiple relays. The protocols utilize orthogonal frequency division multiplexing to estimate the channel frequency response between the legitimate communicating parties to identify if a relay attack is occurring in a physical-layer challenge-response authentication protocol. The proposed protocols can be leveraged on many existing hardware platforms and can simultaneously support high data rates. To evaluate the performance of the protocol, MATLAB simulations are done to gather Monte-Carlo results on performance criterion.

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