Civilian GNSS Spoofing, Detection, and Recovery

Psiaki, Mark L.; Humphreys, Todd E.

doi:10.1002/9781119458449.ch25

Cited by 20 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 33 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The L1 interference is a composite of individual signals with a common carrier centered near GPS L1 but each having a unique GPS L1 C/A pseudorandom number (PRN) spreading code. Such interference can be categorized as matched‐code GNSS interference (Humphreys, 2017; Psiaki & Humphreys, 2020). Signals corresponding to almost all GPS L1 C/A PRN codes from 1 to 32 have been detected.…”

Section: Analysis Of Interference From Syriamentioning

confidence: 99%

First results from three years of GNSS interference monitoring from low Earth orbit

et al. 2021

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Observation of terrestrial GNSS interference (jamming and spoofing) from low Earth orbit (LEO) is a uniquely effective technique for characterizing the scope, strength, and structure of interference and for estimating transmitter locations. Such details are useful for situational awareness, interference deterrence, and the development of interference‐hardened GNSS receivers. This paper presents the results of a three‐year study of global interference, with emphasis on a particularly powerful interference source active in Syria since 2017. It then explores the implications of such interference for GNSS receiver operation and design.

show abstract

Section: Analysis Of Interference From Syriamentioning

confidence: 99%

First results from three years of GNSS interference monitoring from low Earth orbit

et al. 2021

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This service, the first of its kind, openly provides the means to authenticate the navigation messages and the identity of the satellites used in the position, velocity and time (PVT) computation in a GNSS receiver (henceforth, we will refer to a satellite as authenticated meaning: that both its identity and transmitted navigation message have been authenticated following the OSNMA protocol). This capability adds an effective layer against attacks using counterfeit signals, also known as spoofing [ 10 ], and opens the door to authenticated positioning .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

RTK+OSNMA Positioning for Road Applications: An Experimental Performance Analysis in Finland

Vallet García,

Bhuiyan

2024

Sensors

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We compare the performance of dual-band (GPS L1/L2 and Galileo E1/E5a) real-time kinematic (RTK) positioning in an open sky and urban scenarios in southern Finland using two different authentication schemes: one using only satellites authenticated by Galileo’s open service navigation message authentication (OSNMA) service (which at the moment of our tests led to using only authenticated Galileo satellites) and the other with no authentication. The results show the actual trade-off between accuracy and availability vs. authenticity associated with using only OSNMA-authenticated satellites, while the authentication of only Galileo satellites is possible (e.g., a drop of RTK positioning availability from 96.67 to 86.01% in our open sky and from 73.55 to 18.65% in our urban scenarios, respectively), and an upper bound of the potential performance that could be reached in similar experimental conditions had the authentication of GPS satellites been supported (e.g., an overall 14 cm and 10.20 m 95% horizontal accuracy in our open sky and urban scenarios, with below 30, 20 and 10 cm during 97.39, 96.03 and 92.43% of the time in the open sky and 49.12, 45.96 and 39.63% in the urban scenarios, respectively).

show abstract

“…GNSS signals have low power and are susceptible to interference. They are severely limited in scenarios where signals are blocked or in urban multipath jamming environments, to the extent that they cannot provide effective positioning services for UAVs [2][3][4]. These factors have become important constraints fective positioning services for UAVs [2][3][4].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They are severely limited in scenarios where signals are blocked or in urban multipath jamming environments, to the extent that they cannot provide effective positioning services for UAVs [2][3][4]. These factors have become important constraints fective positioning services for UAVs [2][3][4]. These factors have become important constraints affecting further development in the UAV field [5,6].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Study on Anti-Jamming Algorithms in Low-Earth-Orbit Satellite Signal-of-Opportunity Positioning Systems for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

Yao,

Qin,

et al. 2024

Drones

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Low-Earth-Orbit (LEO) satellite Signal-of-Opportunity (SOP) positioning technology has gradually matured to meet the accuracy requirements for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) positioning in daily scenarios. Advancements in miniaturization technology for positioning terminals have also made this technology’s application to UAV positioning crucial for UAV development. However, in the increasingly complex electromagnetic environment, there remains a significant risk of degradation in positioning performance for UAVs in LEO satellite SOP positioning due to unintentional or malicious jamming. Furthermore, there is a lack of in-depth research from scholars both domestically and internationally on the anti-jamming capabilities of LEO satellite SOP positioning technology. Due to significant differences in the downlink signal characteristics between LEO satellites and Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals based on Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) or Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) satellites, the anti-jamming research results of traditional satellite navigation systems cannot be directly applied. This study addresses the narrow bandwidth and high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) characteristics of signals from LEO satellite constellations. We propose a Consecutive Iteration based on Signal Cancellation (SCCI) algorithm, which significantly reduces errors during the model fitting process. Additionally, an adaptive variable convergence factor was designed to simultaneously balance convergence speed and steady-state error during the iteration process. Compared to traditional algorithms, simulation and experimental results demonstrated that the proposed algorithm enhances the effectiveness of jamming threshold settings under narrow bandwidth and high-power conditions. In the context of LEO satellite jamming scenarios, it improves the frequency-domain anti-jamming performance significantly and holds high application value for drone positioning.

show abstract

Civilian GNSS Spoofing, Detection, and Recovery

Cited by 20 publications

References 33 publications

First results from three years of GNSS interference monitoring from low Earth orbit

First results from three years of GNSS interference monitoring from low Earth orbit

RTK+OSNMA Positioning for Road Applications: An Experimental Performance Analysis in Finland

A Study on Anti-Jamming Algorithms in Low-Earth-Orbit Satellite Signal-of-Opportunity Positioning Systems for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About