Clashes in the Assembly

Voeten, Erik

doi:10.1162/002081800551154

Cited by 390 publications

(259 citation statements)

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“…15 See Gilpin (1981). 16 Voeten (2000) discusses three hypotheses derived from realist scholarship, the stability hypothesis, structuralist hypothesis, and counterhegemonic bloc hypothesis. All three theories make predictions on the behavior of UNGA voting based on international factors.…”

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The first set of figures presents a representative former Warsaw Pact country, Bulgaria. The left panel of figure 2 presents the 21 To the contrary, Voeten (2000) finds that the position of countries still corresponds more closely to their Cold War East-West dimension than to the North-South dimension. 22 Voeten (2000) finds that post 1996 the United States became increasingly isolated in the UNGA over time.…”

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confidence: 92%

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Country or leader? Political change and UN General Assembly voting

Dreher

Jensen

2013

European Journal of Political Economy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. In this project we explore the relationship between leader change and relations between states. Voting in the United Nation's General Assembly (UNGA) is often used as a measure of political proximity between countries. We use UN voting coincidence to examine how changes in leadership affect relations. Specifically, we examine how political change affects a country's voting with the United States. In this paper we explore how leadership change affects UNGA voting. Using differences between "key" and "non-key" UN votes to the United States, we explore if political change is driven by preference change or by a changing external position. While political change has little impact on voting on non-key issues (state preferences) we find that after leadership change, countries are more likely to vote in line with the United States on key UN votes. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 92%

Country or leader? Political change and UN General Assembly voting

Dreher

Jensen

2013

European Journal of Political Economy

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“…Second, estimates from roll call analysis can be used to test theories of legislative behavior. For instance, roll call analysis has been used Joshua Clinton is Assistant Professor, Department of Politics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540 (clinton@princeton.edu).Simon Jackman is Associate Professor (Voeten 2000). In short, roll call analysis make conjectures about legislative behavior amenable to quantitative analysis, helping make the study of legislative politics an empirically grounded, cumulative body of scientific knowledge.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Simon Jackman is Associate Professor (Voeten 2000). In short, roll call analysis make conjectures about legislative behavior amenable to quantitative analysis, helping make the study of legislative politics an empirically grounded, cumulative body of scientific knowledge.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data

2004

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Modern studies of legislative behavior focus upon the relationship among the policy preferences of legislators, institutional arrangements, and legislative outcomes. In spatial models of legislatures, policies are represented geometrically, as points in a low-dimensional Euclidean space. Each legislator has a most preferred policy or ideal point in this space and his or her utility for a policy declines with the distance of the policy from his or her ideal point; see Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook (1970) for an early survey.The primary use of roll call data-the recorded votes of deliberative bodies 1 -is the estimation of ideal points. The appeal and importance of ideal point estimation arises in two ways. First, ideal point estimates let us describe legislators and legislatures. The distribution of ideal points estimates reveals how cleavages between legislators reflect partisan affiliation or region or become more polarized over time (e.g., McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2001). Roll call data serve similar purposes for interest groups, such as Americans for Democratic Action, the National Taxpayers Union, and the Sierra Club, to produce "ratings" of legislators along different policy dimensions. Second, estimates from roll call analysis can be used to test theories of legislative behavior. For instance, roll call analysis has been used Joshua Clinton is Assistant Professor, Department of Politics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540 (clinton@princeton.edu).Simon Jackman is Associate Professor (Voeten 2000). In short, roll call analysis make conjectures about legislative behavior amenable to quantitative analysis, helping make the study of legislative politics an empirically grounded, cumulative body of scientific knowledge.Current methods of estimating ideal points in political science suffer from both statistical and theoretical deficiencies. First, any method of ideal point estimation embodies an explicit or implicit model of legislative behavior. Generally, it is inappropriate to use ideal points estimated under one set of assumptions (such as sincere voting over a unidimensional policy space) to test a different behavioral model (such as log-rolling). Second, the computations required for estimating even the simplest roll call model are very difficult and extending these models to incorporate more realistic behavioral assumptions is nearly impossible with extant methods. Finally, the statistical basis of current methods for ideal point estimation is, to be polite, questionable. Roll call analysis involves very large numbers of parameters, since each legislator has an ideal point and each bill has a policy location that must be estimated. Popular methods of roll call analysis compute standard errors that are admittedly invalid (Poole and Rosenthal 1997, 246) and one cannot appeal to standard statistical theory to ensure the consistency and other properties of estimators (we revisit this point below).In this paper we develop and illustrate Bayesian methods for ideal point estimation and the analysis of...

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“…Como se ao optar pela abstenção o país indicasse que estaria mais ou menos de acordo (Luif, 2003). A segunda abordagem interpreta a abstenção como um como um "não" suave, de forma que as categorias "abstenção" e "não" são fundidas em uma só categoria, a exemplo de Volgy, Frazier e Ingersoll (2003) e Voeten (2000.…”

Section: Geopolítica(s)unclassified

Mercosur y BRICS: la convergencia en la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas

Olveira¹,

Onuki²

2014

Geopolítica

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RESUMOA perspectiva dos poderes emergentes em influenciar a ordem internacional depende, em grande medida, da capacidade de ação coletiva. É necessário que esses países sejam capazes de gerar coesão de posições no âmbito dos regimes e organizações internacionais. Caso não consigam forjar coordenação, é improvável que consigam ampliar o poder de barganha para além do que já detêm individualmente. Este artigo tem por objetivo analisar o peso das coalizões regional e globais como elemento indutor da coesão de comportamento em arenas multilaterais. O Brasil é tomado como país de referência. Analisa-se a evolução do grau de convergência do posicionamento do Brasil na Assembleia Geral da ONU (AGNU) com três grupos de países: Mercosul, BRICS 1 e potências nucleares. A análise cobre o período de 1946 e 2008. Procura-se entender o peso específico das coalizões como elemento indutor de maior convergência de posicionamento na AGNU. A mensuração da afinidade entre Brasil e potências nucleares serve como grupo controle, tendo em vista o fato de que tanto Mercosul -no plano subregional-quanto BRICS -no plano global-são coalizões motivadas em contrabalancear o peso hegemônico norte-americano na ordem internacional.

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Clashes in the Assembly

Cited by 390 publications

References 22 publications

Country or leader? Political change and UN General Assembly voting

Country or leader? Political change and UN General Assembly voting

The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data

Mercosur y BRICS: la convergencia en la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas

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