Classifications and Applications of Physical Layer Security Techniques for Confidentiality: A Comprehensive Survey

Hamamreh, Jehad M.; Furqan, Haji M.; Arslan, Hüseyin

doi:10.1109/comst.2018.2878035

Cited by 575 publications

(330 citation statements)

References 402 publications

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“…Alice and Bob are assumed to have a single antenna each for simplicity, while Mallory has two transmit antennas. 1 The fading channel realization in the link Alice-Bob is denoted by the complex circularly symmetric Gaussian random variable H ∼ CN (0, σ 2 ). To obtain estimates of H, Alice and Bob exchange pilot signals X with E[|X| 2 ] ≤ P .…”

Section: Mim In W-skg Systems: Injection Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the past two decades a large number of studies and patents appeared on the topic of wireless secret key generation (W-SKG) schemes that exploit channel reciprocity as the source of shared randomness (see [1] for a comprehensive review and [2] for a tutorial on physical layer security including W-SKG). Additionally, W-SKG over unauthenticated channels has been proposed in [3].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Furthermore, a large number of practical demonstrators have provided "proof of concept" [5], [6]. A resurgence of interest in W-SKG has been witnessed recently as these technologies could be considered for application in B5G systems [1], in particular in the context of Internet of things (IoT) [7] and -potentially -URLLC applications. W-SKG could be a good fit in these systems as the limited computational resources and strict delay constraints can render challenging the use of standard security protocols such as the transport layer security protocol (TLS) protocol and it's IoT friendly version, the datagram transport layer security (DTLS) protocol.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Man-in-the-Middle and Denial of Service Attacks in Wireless Secret Key Generation

Mitev

Chorti

Belmega

et al. 2019

2019 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM)

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Wireless secret key generation (W-SKG) from shared randomness (e.g., from the wireless channel fading realizations), is a well established scheme that can be used for session key agreement. W-SKG approaches can be of particular interest in delay constrained wireless networks and notably in the context of ultra reliable low latency communications (URLLC) in beyond fifth generation (B5G) systems. However W-SKG schemes are known to be malleable over the so called "advantage distillation" phase, during which observations of the shared randomness are obtained at the legitimate parties. As an example, an active attacker can act as a man-in-themiddle (MiM) by injecting pilot signals and/or can mount denial of service attacks (DoS) in the form of jamming. This paper investigates the impact of injection and reactive jamming attacks in W-SKG. First, it is demonstrated that injection attacks can be reduced to -potentially less harmful -jamming attacks by pilot randomization; a novel system design with randomized QPSK pilots is presented. Subsequently, the optimal jamming strategy is identified in a block fading additive white Gaussian noise (BF-AWGN) channel in the presence of a reactive jammer, using a game theoretic formulation. It is shown that the impact of a reactive jammer is far more severe than that of a simple proactive jammer.Index Terms-Wireless secret key agreement, shared randomness, injection attack, man-in-the-middle, denial of service attack, jamming.

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Section: Mim In W-skg Systems: Injection Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Man-in-the-Middle and Denial of Service Attacks in Wireless Secret Key Generation

Mitev

Chorti

Belmega

et al. 2019

2019 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM)

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“…In other words, this is the symmetric key that is used both in encryption and decryption process. For example, if the original OFDM symbol is [a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 5 ], then the resulted randomized sequence is [a 5 , a 3 , a 1 , a 2 , a 4 ], where the key is [5,3,1,2,4]. The cyclic prefix (CP) is added after that to be able to extract frequency response of the channel at the receiver, which is detailed in § IV-B.…”

Section: A Transmitter Design Of Rand-ofdmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rand-OFDM: A Secured Wireless Signal

Mohammed

Saha

2020

2020 International Conference on COMmunication Systems &Amp; NETworkS (COMSNETS)

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Wireless communication has been a broadcast system since its inception, which violates security and privacy issues at the physical layer between the intended transmit and receive pairs. As we move towards advanced spectrum sharing methodologies involving billions of devices connected over wireless networks, it is essential to secure the wireless signal such that only the intended receiver can realize the properties of the signal. In this paper, we propose Rand-OFDM, a new waveform, secured with a shared secret key, where the signal properties can be recovered only at the expected receiver. We achieve the signal level security by modifying the OFDM signal in time-domain, thus erasing the OFDM properties and in turn obfuscating the signal properties to an eavesdropper. We introduce a key-based secured training signal for channel estimation, which can be used only at the intended receiver with prior knowledge of the key. As a final step for the recovery of the signal, we use a clustering based technique to correct the phase of the received signal. Our cryptanalysis shows that Rand-OFDM is especially useful in future wide band signals. Extensive simulation and overthe-air experiments show that the performance of Rand-OFDM is comparable to legacy OFDM and SNR penalty due to the secured waveform varies between ≈ 1-4dB. In all these scenarios, Rand-OFDM remains unrecognized by the adversary even at the highest possible SNR.

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“…In that case, it is highly possible that the critical information will be leaked to the radar targets by the emission of the DFRC waveform. Given the fact above, physical layer security (PHY-security) must be considered in DFRC designs [7], [8]. Particularly, it has been widely understood that the communication secrecy could be enhanced by exploiting the artificial noise (AN).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enhancing the Physical Layer Security of Dual-Functional Radar Communication Systems

Liu

Masouros

2019

2019 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM)

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Dual-functional radar communication (DFRC) system has recently attracted significant academic attentions as an enabling solution for realizing radar-communication spectrum sharing. During the DFRC transmission, however, the critical information could be leaked to the targets, which might be potential eavesdroppers. Therefore, the physical layer security has to be taken into consideration. In this paper, fractional programming (FP) problems are formulated to minimize the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at targets under the constraints for the SINR of legitimate users. By doing so, the secrecy rate of communication can be guaranteed. We first assume that communication CSI and the angle of the target are precisely known. After that, problem is extended to the cases with uncertainty in the target's location, which indicates that the target might appear in a certain angular interval. Finally, numerical results have been provided to validate the effectiveness of the proposed method showing that it is viable to guarantee both radar and secrecy communication performances by using the techniques we propose.Index Terms-DFRC system, physical layer security, FP problem, secrecy rate.

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Classifications and Applications of Physical Layer Security Techniques for Confidentiality: A Comprehensive Survey

Cited by 575 publications

References 402 publications

Man-in-the-Middle and Denial of Service Attacks in Wireless Secret Key Generation

Man-in-the-Middle and Denial of Service Attacks in Wireless Secret Key Generation

Rand-OFDM: A Secured Wireless Signal

Enhancing the Physical Layer Security of Dual-Functional Radar Communication Systems

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