Clausewitz, intelligence, uncertainty and the art of command in military operations

Ferris, John; Handel, Michael I.

doi:10.1080/02684529508432286

Cited by 8 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Science is often hotly contested (Jasanoff 1987; Hackett 2005), although usually not as violently as in war. At the same time, the expanding role of information work has created a more civilianized, office-like experience for a growing proportion of military practitioners (Janowitz 1959; Ferris and Handel 1995). Just as “the making, maintaining, and modification of scientific knowledge is a local and a mundane affair” (Shapin 1995, 303), war is also more “littered by endless minor obstacles than…great, momentous questions” (Clausewitz 1976, 120).…”

Section: Data Friction and The Fog Of Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

Target Practice

Lindsay

2017

Science, Technology, & Human Values

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The nineteenth-century strategist Carl von Clausewitz describes “fog” and “friction” as fundamental features of war. Military leverage of sophisticated information technology in the twenty-first century has improved some tactical operations but has not lifted the fog of war, in part, because the means for reducing uncertainty create new forms of it. Drawing on active duty experience with an American special operations task force in Western Iraq from 2007 to 2008, this article traces the targeting processes used to “find, fix, and finish” alleged insurgents. In this case they did not clarify the political reality of Anbar province but rather reinforced a parochial worldview informed by the Naval Special Warfare community. The unit focused on the performance of “direct action” raids during a period in which “indirect action” engagement with the local population was arguably more appropriate for the strategic circumstances. The concept of “data friction”, therefore, can be understood not simply as a form of resistance within a sociotechnical system but also as a form of traction that enables practitioners to construct representations of the world that amplify their own biases.

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Section: Data Friction and The Fog Of Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

Target Practice

Lindsay

2017

Science, Technology, & Human Values

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“…The change in the culture of command is the certainty required in decision making. Traditionally, commanders have waited until they gathered what information is available before choosing a course of action (Ferris and Handel, 1995). However, a force risks losing its dominance if it waits too long, and, given the effects of RMA, the period one can wait is shrinking.…”

Section: Real-time Decision Makingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Applying the Revolution in Military Affairs to Intelligence

Kurliak¹

2018

JICW

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This paper identifies how the concept of the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' can be applied to the intelligence process to address the overabundance of information produced by contemporary technologies. Three tenets from the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' are examined as possible remedies for failings in the intelligence process. Drawing on previous intelligence failures, the case is made that applying the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' will improve the intelligence process and allow for agencies to stay on top of the large quantity of information they handle. The finding is that by incorporating these tenets, intelligence services can improve the quality of intelligence that they produce. Keywords: Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), intelligence, informationThe concept of the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA) goes back as early as the 1970s (Metz and Kievit, 1995), and theorizes that information technology is altering the "knowledge available to armed forces, and thus the nature of war" (Ferris, 2009, 455). RMA is based on an understanding that information gives forces an edge over their opponents, and the usage of technology allows this to happen at a faster pace than ever before (Lucas, 2010). The definition of RMA for this paper is adapted from Betz (2006) and Ferris (2009) to mean the usage of information technology by either state or non-state forces to achieve and maintain a force's dominance in warfare faster than their opponents can.The problem with RMA, however, is that there is now an overabundance of information and the current methods used to determine what is useful for commanders and decision-makers cannot keep up (Betz, 2006;Betz, 2008;Ferris, 2009). This represents an issue in the intelligence process. In response, the question has been asked, if there is a RMA relating to the way information and technology are changing war, can the same concept be applied to intelligence? This paper argues that the concept of RMA can be applied to intelligence to address the issue of information overabundance and the methods used to determine how useful information is. This can be accomplished by incorporating three elements into the intelligence process: flexible command

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Wellington's use of deception tactics in the Peninsular War

Davies¹

2006

Journal of Strategic Studies

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Clausewitz, intelligence, uncertainty and the art of command in military operations

Cited by 8 publications

References 12 publications

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Applying the Revolution in Military Affairs to Intelligence

Wellington's use of deception tactics in the Peninsular War

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