Clean Evidence on Peer Effects

Falk, Armin; Ichino, Andrea

doi:10.1086/497818

Cited by 756 publications

(586 citation statements)

References 28 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

533

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…If this were true, then similar peer e¤ects should be found for other baseball stars. As we show later, we do not …nd similar e¤ects for other stars, which casts doubt on the hypothesis that star players "crowd out" the performance of 13 The results are very similar if we control for managerial quality with 193 dummy variables for each manager instead of the manager's lifetime winning percentage. The coe¢cient for homeruns in Table 4 becomes 1.94 with a standard error of 0.61 (the coe¢cient in Table 4 is 1.97 with a standard error of 0.59).…”

mentioning

confidence: 54%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Learning unethical practices from a co-worker: The peer effect of Jose Canseco

Gould

Kaplan

2011

Labour Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper examines the issue of whether workers learn productive skills from their co-workers, even if those skills are unethical. Speci…cally, we estimate whether Jose Canseco, a star baseball player in the late 1980's and 1990's, a¤ected the performance of his teammates by introducing them to steroids. Using panel data, we show that a player's performance increases signi…cantly after they played with Jose Canseco. After checking 30 comparable players from the same era, we …nd that no other baseball player produced a similar e¤ect. Furthermore, the positive e¤ect of Canseco disappears after 2003, the year that drug testing was implemented. These results suggest that workers not only learn productive skills from their co-workers, but sometimes those skills may derive from unethical practices. These …ndings may be relevant to many workplaces where competitive pressures create incentives to adopt unethical means to boost productivity and pro…ts. Our analysis leads to several potential policy implications designed to reduce the spread of unethical behavior among workers.

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 54%

“…The e¤ect of "after Canseco" increases from 0.97 to 1.97 for home runs, 3.14 to 5.74 for strikeouts, and 2.98 to 5.24 for RBIs. 13 As noted above, higher values for these measures are indicative of a higher performing "power hitter", which suggests that Canseco improved the performance of power hitters.…”

mentioning

confidence: 87%

Learning unethical practices from a co-worker: The peer effect of Jose Canseco

Gould

Kaplan

2011

Labour Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This specification uses only the between-subject variation -it is essentially a difference-in-differences estimation -to identify the parameters in equation (1). 24 That is, the between-subject analysis provides estimates of the parameters of interest using information up to the point where subjects have been exposed to at most one change in the compensation they face, compared to the baseline condition of being paid a 2.5p piece rate. Reassuringly, the magnitudes of the estimated parameters are very similar to the ones using all four sessions.…”

Section: Results For the Whole Samplementioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Philanthropy and Productivity: Evidence from an Online Real Effort Experiment

2015

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Contributing to a social cause can be an important driver for workers in the public and nonprofit sector as well as in firms that engage in Corporate Philanthropy or other Corporate Social Responsibility policies. This paper compares the effectiveness of social incentivesthat take the form of a donation received by a charity of the subject's choice -to financial incentives. We find that social incentives lead to a 13% rise in productivity, regardless of their form (lump sum or related to performance) or strength. The response is strong for subjects with low initial productivity (30%), while high-productivity subjects do not respond. When subjects can choose the mix of incentives half sacrifice some of their private compensation to increase social compensation, with women more likely than men. Furthermore, offering subjects some discretion in choosing their own payment scheme leads to a substantial improvement in performance. Comparing social incentives to an equally costly increase in private compensation for low productivity subjects reveals that the former are less effective in increasing productivity, but the difference is small and not statistically significant. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Code: D640, J240, J320, L300, M140, M520.

show abstract

“…Moreover, new workers imitate the behaviour of older colleagues. Evidence for these forms of peer pressures also comes from experiments (Falk and Ichino, 2006), while a more theoretical analysis of the tendency towards conformism is given by Bernheim (1994).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Education, dynamic signalling, and social distance

Gallice

2008

Oxford Economic Papers

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In many European countries the average level of education has grown steadily over the last few generations. The paper shows how such a trend can be easily rationalized by a model that extends a standard signalling game in two directions. First, a temporal structure is induced by having two different cohorts of individuals playing the game. Second, to standard rational agents, the model postulates the existence of two classes of agents that care about their relative position in the distribution of educational choices. Conformist individuals wish to be close to the average level; status seeking individuals seek to be above it. Results show that the presence of these two classes of individuals generates an average level of education that changes and increases over time for a wide range of choice of parameters. Consequences of this increasing level of education on the behaviour of the firms are also explored.JEL classifications: I20, D82.

show abstract

Clean Evidence on Peer Effects

Cited by 756 publications

References 28 publications

Learning unethical practices from a co-worker: The peer effect of Jose Canseco

Learning unethical practices from a co-worker: The peer effect of Jose Canseco

Corporate Philanthropy and Productivity: Evidence from an Online Real Effort Experiment

Education, dynamic signalling, and social distance

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About