Clientelism and dominant incumbent parties: party competition in an urban Turkish neighbourhood

Yıldırım, Kerem

doi:10.1080/13510347.2019.1658744

Cited by 29 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…Indeed, other scholars have explored AKP’s crony and clientelistic ties to businessmen (Esen and Gumuscu, 2018; Gürakar, 2016; Ocaklı, 2018) and the urban poor (Ark-Yıldırım, 2017; Yıldırım, 2020; Yörük, 2012), yet they have not specified the impact of such practices on democratic backsliding. Building on these studies, we put forth a causal analysis that connects these processes often treated in isolation in the literature.…”

Section: Why Do Democracies Break Down?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why did Turkish democracy collapse? A political economy account of AKP’s authoritarianism

Esen

Gümüşçü

2020

Party Politics

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After decades of multiparty politics, Turkey is no longer a democracy. A theory-upending case, the country has descended into a competitive authoritarian regime under the Justice and Development Party ( Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—AKP), despite rising income and education levels and strong links with the West. What accounts for democratic breakdown in such an unlikely case? Instead of ideological and institutional factors, we offer a political economy account. We contend that the coalitional ties that the AKP forged with businesses and the urban poor through the distribution of public resources has altered the cost of toleration for the party leadership and their dependent clients, while reducing the cost of suppression for incumbents. This new political calculus led to increasing authoritarianism of the AKP government through securitization of dissent, mounting repression, and systematic violation of civil liberties.

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Section: Why Do Democracies Break Down?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why did Turkish democracy collapse? A political economy account of AKP’s authoritarianism

Esen

Gümüşçü

2020

Party Politics

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“…This led scholars to search for deviations, to map the forms taken by clientelism across political systems, and to analyze the social, political, and historical roots of clientelism. The latter are well reflected in a series of recent studies on democratizing countries (Aspinall and Hicken 2020;Denissen 2020;Driscoll 2020;Veenendaal and Corbett 2020;Weiss 2020;Yıldırım 2020).…”

Section: Studying Electoral Clientelismmentioning

confidence: 87%

Political parties, state resources and electoral clientelism

Gherghina

2021

Acta Polit

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Contemporary political parties often use state resources to win elections. In this context, electoral clientelism evolved from the straightforward vote buying to sophisticated exchanges in which the relationship between patrons (parties or candidates) and clients (voters) is sometimes difficult to grasp. We address the question how do the distributive politics and electoral clientelism interact, how these forms of interactions differ across various context, and what implications they bring for the functioning of political systems. The special issue provides theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions to the burgeoning literature about the multi-faceted feature of electoral clientelism. It unfolds the complex relationship between distributive politics and clientelism, and conceptualizes electoral clientelism as a dynamic process that occurs through different sequences. It enriches the methodological tools aimed at investigating electoral clientelism. Finally, the special issue approaches clientelism from several perspectives and brings together substantive empirical evidence about the varieties of clientelism around the world.

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“…Furthermore, demographic factors like population size (Veenendal and Corbet 2020) and ethnic identities (Posner 2005;Isaksson and Bigsten 2017) shape the type of clientelistic networks and targets of inducements. In addition, economic development (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007;Stokes et al 2013), degree of competition (Chubb 1982;Magaloni et al 2007;Medina and Stokes 2007;Driscoll 2018;Yıldırım 2020), and institutions and institutional junctures (Fukuyama 2013; Aspinall and Hicken 2020; Driscoll 2020), are all likely to affect the type of clientelistic operations observed within a given case.…”

Section: Clientelism -Many Varieties Few Detrimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Other studies link clientelism to the viability of programmatic campaigns (Keefer 2007 Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci 2017), degree of party system competition (Magaloni et al 2007;Medina and Stokes 2007;Driscoll 2018;Yıldırım 2020), level of ethnic fractionalization (Easterly and Levine 1997;Posner 2005;Chandra 2007;Baldwin and Huber 2010), and dysfunctional institutions and governance (Acemoglu and Robinson 2010;Rothstein 2011; 2018; Fukuyama 2013). These findings suggest that economic development is unlikely to be the only avenue through which clientelism decreases.…”

Section: Clientelism -Many Varieties Few Detrimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutions of Electoral Integrity and Clientelism: The Role of Electoral Management Bodies

Lundstedt¹,

Edgell

2020

SSRN Journal

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Clientelism and dominant incumbent parties: party competition in an urban Turkish neighbourhood

Cited by 29 publications

References 48 publications

Why did Turkish democracy collapse? A political economy account of AKP’s authoritarianism

Why did Turkish democracy collapse? A political economy account of AKP’s authoritarianism

Political parties, state resources and electoral clientelism

Institutions of Electoral Integrity and Clientelism: The Role of Electoral Management Bodies

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