Climate Change and Second-Order Uncertainty: Defending a Generalized, Normative, and Structural Argument from Inductive Risk

Steel, Daniel

doi:10.1162/posc_a_00229

Cited by 31 publications

(39 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Lack of cer-tainty is a linchpin of the value ladenness of science, as data do not speak for themselves and scientific conclusions are the result of value-laden choices made throughout the scientific process. We align ourselves with Douglas (2009), among others (Elliott & Richards, 2017;Steel, 2016), who argue that the value-free ideal is particularly problematic in the context of evidence-based recommendations in areas embroiled in uncertainty, and that values embedded in science in such situations should play a role. We side with researchers who argue that a better understanding of how such values may be laid bare, embraced, and incorporated in the policy process is warranted.…”

Section: Science Uncertainty Values and Worldviewsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A recent assessment of the literature (Spruijt et al, 2014) suggests that research examining the role of science-based policy advice has remained primarily theoretical at higher aggregate levels, with little attention to empirical investigation. Much of the research that examines the role of experts' values, worldviews, and inductive risk judgments has examined "big" topics such as climate science, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and GMOs (Beaudrie et al, 2014;Edenhofer & Kowarsch, 2015;Elliot, 2011;Krimsky, 2000;Slovic, 2013;Steel, 2016). To our knowledge, there are no studies that probe into the role of value judgments and the framing of risk and uncertainty in practical and pragmatic fields such as sewage management.…”

Section: Science Uncertainty Values and Worldviewsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Science for Policy: A Case Study of Scientific Polarization, Values, and the Framing of Risk and Uncertainty

et al. 2018

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It is well documented that more research can lead to hardened positions, particularly when dealing with complex, controversial, and value‐laden issues. This study is an attempt to unveil underlying values in a contemporary debate, where both sides use scientific evidence to support their argument. We analyze the problem framing, vocabulary, interpretation of evidence, and policy recommendations, with particular attention to the framing of nature and technology. We find clear differences between the two arguments. One side stress that there is no evidence that the present approach is causing harm to humans or the environment, does not ruminate on uncertainties to that end, references nature's ability to handle the problem, and indicates distrust in technological solutions. In contrast, the other side focuses on uncertainties, particularly the lack of knowledge about potential environmental effects and signals trust in technological development and human intervention as the solution. Our study suggests that the two sides’ diverging interpretations are tied to their perception of nature: vulnerable to human activities versus robust and able to handle human impacts. The two sides also seem to hold diverging views of technology, but there are indications that this might be rooted in their perception of governance and economy rather than about technology per se. We conclude that there is a need to further investigate how scientific arguments are related to worldviews, to see how (if at all) worldview typologies can help us to understand how value‐based judgments are embedded in science advice, and the impact these have on policy preferences.

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Section: Science Uncertainty Values and Worldviewsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Science Uncertainty Values and Worldviewsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Science for Policy: A Case Study of Scientific Polarization, Values, and the Framing of Risk and Uncertainty

et al. 2018

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“…In particular when the risks are severe, e.g., the catastrophes that may be caused by the public not accepting the theory of global climate change, scientists should express their public claims with more certainty. Steel (2016)…”

Section: Inductive Risk and Calibration Of Reliability Standardsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust and Distributed Epistemic Labor

Miller¹,

Freiman²

2020

The Routledge Handbook of Trust and Philosophy

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“…How large a plurality? (Andreasen & Doty, ) The trade‐off between the pressure to get an answer and the pressure not to leave something out still plays a role, even when formal approaches are used to explicitly model uncertainty (Hicks, ; Steel, ). There is no single, formally correct way to make this trade‐off.…”

Section: The Argument From Inductive Riskmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inductive Risk, Science, and Values: A Reply to MacGillivray

2019

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The argument from inductive risk (AIR) is perhaps the most common argument against the value‐free ideal of science. Brian MacGillivray rejects the AIR (at least as it would apply to risk assessment) and embraces the value‐free ideal. We clarify the issues at stake and argue that MacGillivray's criticisms, although effective against some formulations of the AIR, fail to overcome the essential concerns that motivate the AIR. There are inevitable trade‐offs in scientific enquiry that cannot be resolved with any formal methods or general rules. Choices must be made, and values will be involved. It is best to recognize this explicitly. Even so, there is more work to be done developing methods and institutional support for these choices.

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Climate Change and Second-Order Uncertainty: Defending a Generalized, Normative, and Structural Argument from Inductive Risk

Cited by 31 publications

References 39 publications

Science for Policy: A Case Study of Scientific Polarization, Values, and the Framing of Risk and Uncertainty

Science for Policy: A Case Study of Scientific Polarization, Values, and the Framing of Risk and Uncertainty

Trust and Distributed Epistemic Labor

Inductive Risk, Science, and Values: A Reply to MacGillivray

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