Inductive Risk, Science, and Values: A Reply to MacGillivray

Hicks, Daniel J.; Magnus, P. D.; Wright, Jessey

doi:10.1111/risa.13434

Cited by 10 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…Too often we try to explain away misperceptions, rather than appreciating, valuing, and exploring community perceptions and traditional knowledge (Table 1). Risk assessment itself is not value‐free or neutral (MacGillivray, 2019, but see Hicks et al., 2020). Deciding what, when, where and how to communicate is partly value driven.…”

Section: Communication Community and Consequencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Trust and consequences: Role of community science, perceptions, values, and environmental justice in risk communication

Burger

2022

Risk Analysis

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Risk communication is often viewed as imparting information and perhaps as a two‐way dialogue. Risk communication inadequacies on the part of both “communicator” and “community members” can lead to adverse consequences and amplify environmental justice disparities. The paper suggests a transformational approach where risk communicators must learn to trust community experts and their knowledge base (and act upon it), where risk information imparted by risk communicators addresses what communities are most concerned about (as well as risk from specific chemicals or radionuclides), and where risk information and assessments address underlying issues and disparities, as well as cultural traditions (among others). Providing risk probabilities is no longer sufficient; western science may not be enough, and community and native scientific knowledge is needed. Risk communication (or information transfer) for environmental risks that are ongoing usually applies to low‐income, minority communities—people living in dense inner cities, rural communities, Native American communities—or to people living near a risky facility. Communication within this context requires mutual trust, listening and respect, as well as acceptance of indigenous and community knowledge as equally valuable. Examples are given to illustrate a community perspective.

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Section: Communication Community and Consequencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Value neutral or value free It is best to recognize that all scientific inquiry, whether western or Native American, involves choices, which come from values (Hicks et al, 2020;MacGillivray, 2019).…”

Section: Uncertaintymentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust and consequences: Role of community science, perceptions, values, and environmental justice in risk communication

Burger

2022

Risk Analysis

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“…I call this the James-Rudner-Douglas (JRD) thesis: Every time scientists announce a judgment of fact, they are making a trade-off between wanting to believe true things and wanting not to believe false things. These are both epistemic motives, so they are not some 1 See also ChoGlueck (2018) and the exchange between MacGillivray (2019) and Hicks, Magnus, and Wright (2020).…”

Section: N Duct I V E R I Skmentioning

confidence: 99%

The scope of inductive risk

Magnus

2022

Metaphilosophy

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The Argument from Inductive Risk (AIR) is taken to show that values are inevitably involved in making judgments or forming beliefs. After reviewing this conclusion, this paper poses cases that are prima facie counterexamples: the unreflective application of conventions, use of black‐boxed instruments, reliance on opaque algorithms, and unskilled observation reports. These cases are counterexamples to the AIR posed in ethical terms as a matter of personal values. Nevertheless, it need not be understood in those terms. The values that load a theory choice may be those of institutions or past actors. This means that the challenge of responsibly handling inductive risk is not merely an ethical issue but is also social, political, and historical.

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“…Hence, pursuing it might have epistemic benefits, and a dissent over it is not NID. A large body of philosophical literature today, however, argues that scientific knowledge is not value free (Douglas 2000;Elliott 2017;Hicks et al 2019;Intemann and de Melo-Martín 2010). This claims applies both to applied and basic science.…”

Section: Fairnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

When Is Scientific Dissent Epistemically Inappropriate?

Miller¹

2021

Philos. of Sci.

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Normatively inappropriate dissent (NID) prevents warranted closure of scientific controversies, and confuses the public and decision makers about policyrelevant science, such as anthropogenic climate change. I identify three conditions for a dissent to be considered normatively inappropriate, and I defend them against recent criticism of the notion of normatively inappropriate dissent by de Melo-Martín and Intemann. I further argue that supplementing these conditions with an inference-to-thebest-explanation account of knowledge-based consensus and dissent allows policy makers to reliably identify when scientific dissent should not be relied on for making policy decisions.

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Inductive Risk, Science, and Values: A Reply to MacGillivray

Cited by 10 publications

References 35 publications

Trust and consequences: Role of community science, perceptions, values, and environmental justice in risk communication

Trust and consequences: Role of community science, perceptions, values, and environmental justice in risk communication

The scope of inductive risk

When Is Scientific Dissent Epistemically Inappropriate?

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