When Is Scientific Dissent Epistemically Inappropriate?

Miller, Boaz

doi:10.1086/714854

Cited by 10 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…To this we have three responses. First, dissent should be 'normatively appropriate ' (de Melo-Martín and Intemann 2018;Miller 2021), so not all instances of dissent proliferation are warranted on normative grounds, let alone epistemic grounds. Second, as de Melo-Martín and Intemann (2018) argue, dissent can contribute to public confusion about science, the spread of false beliefs, and public doubt about established scientific findings; properly justified consent, on the other hand, can have the opposite effects.…”

Section: Consensus-based Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

The Difference-to-Inference Model for Values in Science

Stegenga,

Menon

2023

Res Philosophica

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The value-free ideal for science holds that values should not influence the core features of scientific reasoning. We defend the difference-to-inference model of value-permeation, which holds that value-permeation in science is problematic when values make a difference to the inferences made about a hypothesis. This view of value-permeation is superior to existing views, and it suggests a corresponding maxim—namely, that scientists should strive to eliminate differences to inference. This maxim is the basis of a novel value-free ideal for science.

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Section: Consensus-based Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

The Difference-to-Inference Model for Values in Science

Stegenga,

Menon

2023

Res Philosophica

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“…Another recent line of work has concerned the concept of "normatively inappropriate dissent" (Biddle and Leuschner 2015;Melo-Martín and Intemann 2018;Miller 2021). It might be thought that our two examples of "anti-science epistemic values" can be covered by this concept.…”

Section: Anti-science Epistemic Values?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Second, Miller (2021) offers a revised version of the criteria from Biddle and Leuschner, to address criticisms from Melo-Martín and Intemann (2018). Miller's account involves three individually necessary criteria for normatively appropriate dissent; so, any case of dissent that violates at least one criterion is inappropriate.…”

Section: Anti-science Epistemic Values?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One of Miller's (2021) other criteria, Fairness, might seem more promising: "The inductive risks that would stem from accepting or adopting the dissent, and the respective harms and benefits that they entail, would be fairly and justly distributed among relevant members of or groups in society" (921). The mainstream view is that air pollution, and other environmental hazards, are highly unjustly distributed (Buzzelli 2017).…”

Section: Anti-science Epistemic Values?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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When Virtues are Vices: 'Anti-Science' Epistemic Values in Environmental Politics

Hicks

2021

Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology

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Since at least the mid-2000s, political commentators, environmental advocates, and scientists have raised concerns about an “anti-science” approach to environmental policymaking in conservative governments in the US and Canada. This paper explores and resolves a paradox surrounding at least some uses of the “anti-science” epithet. I examine two cases of such “anti-science” environmental policy, both of which involve appeals to epistemic values that are widely endorsed by both scientists and philosophers of science. It seems paradoxical to call an appeal to epistemic values “anti-science.” I develop an analysis that, I argue, can resolve this paradox. This analysis is a version of the “aims approach” to science and values, drawing on ideas from axiology and virtue ethics. I characterize the paradox in terms of conflicts or tensions between epistemic and pragmatic aims, and argue that there is a key asymmetry between them: epistemic aims are valuable, in part, because they are useful for pursuing pragmatic aims. Thus, when epistemic and pragmatic aims conflict, epistemic aims need to be reconceptualized in order to reconcile them to pragmatic aims. When this is done, in the “anti-science” cases, the epistemic values are scientific vices rather than virtues. Thus the “anti-science” epithet is apt.

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“…Philosophers of science have proposed strategies for navigating this difficult terrain. One of the influential strategies is to develop criteria for distinguishing between dissent that is and that is not problematic (see e.g., Biddle and Leuschner 2015;Le Bihan and Amadi 2017;Leuschner and Fernández Pinto 2021;Miller 2021). This strategy is very helpful in egregious cases where dissenters clearly violate criteria for acceptable dissent.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Navigating dissent by managing value judgments: the case of Lyme disease

Elliott

2023

Synthese

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Recent philosophical literature has highlighted the complexities of handling dissent in science. On one hand, scientific dissent can be very harmful, as when "merchants of doubt" strategically appeal to dissent in order to undermine important environmental and public-health initiatives. On the other hand, scientific dissent can also be beneficial when it helps to promote scientific objectivity, progress, and public engagement. Some authors have responded to this tension by suggesting criteria for distinguishing normatively appropriate and inappropriate dissent, while other authors have suggested that it is more fruitful to alter the social context in which science operates in order to alleviate the negative effects of dissent over the long term. This paper proposes another approach that may be helpful for managing particularly challenging cases of scientific dissent. It argues that instances of scientific dissent often incorporate debates over value judgments, so many difficult cases of dissent can be navigated by: (1) identifying and highlighting those value judgments; and (2) managing those value judgments by drawing strategies from the extensive literature on values and science. The paper illustrates this approach by examining a case study of dissent over the treatment of long-term symptoms associated with Lyme disease.

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When Is Scientific Dissent Epistemically Inappropriate?

Cited by 10 publications

References 25 publications

The Difference-to-Inference Model for Values in Science

The Difference-to-Inference Model for Values in Science

When Virtues are Vices: 'Anti-Science' Epistemic Values in Environmental Politics

Navigating dissent by managing value judgments: the case of Lyme disease

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