Climate change and state evolution

Abstract

Despite the vast evidence on the short-run effects of adverse climate shocks on the economy, our understanding of their long-run impact on institutions is limited. To tackle such a key issue, a vast body of research has focused on ancient societies because of the limited complexity of their economies and their unparalleled experience with environmental and institutional change. Notably, the “collapse archaeology” literature has reported countless correlations consistent with the mantra that severe droughts are bound to trigger institutional crises. This conclusion, however, has been recently challenged by a stream of papers that, building on more detailed data on Bronze Age Mesopotamia and a more credible theory-based empirical strategy, have yielded the following two results. First, severe droughts pushed the elites to grant strong political and property rights to the nonelites to convince them that a sufficient part of the returns on joint investments would be shared via public good provision and, thus, to cooperate and accumulate a culture of cooperation. Second, a more favorable climate allowed the elites to elicit cooperation under less inclusive political regimes as well as a weaker culture of cooperation and, possibly, incomplete property rights. These patterns emphasize the importance of considering the asymmetric effect of droughts and, more generally, combining natural and social sciences for the evaluation of climate-related policies.

Rainfall, Agricultural Output and Persistent Democratization

“…Our empirical work contributes to the literature on the economic determinants of democratization; see Przeworski and Limongi (1997), Barro (1999), Przeworski et al (2000), Acemoglu et al (2008), Br ückner and Ciccone (2011), Aidt and Franck (2015), Aidt and Leon (2016), Caselli and Tesei (2016), Benati et al (2019), Dorsch and Maarek (2020), and Benati and Guerriero (2021). Our work is most closely related to Br ückner and Ciccone (2011).…”

“…Our work is also related to Acemoglu et al (2008) and Benati and Guerriero (2021). With Acemoglu et al (2008), we have in common that we examine the economic determinants of democratization over shorter and longer periods.…”

“…Przeworski and Limongi 1997;Barro 1999;Acemoglu et al 2008;Aidt and Franck 2015;Aidt and Leon 2016) and on whether political institutions are shaped permanently by random events at critical junctures (e.g. Lipset 1959;Mahoney 2001;Capoccia and Kelemen 2007;Acemoglu and Robinson 2012;Benati and Guerriero 2021).…”

“…(2008), Brückner and Ciccone (2011), Aidt and Franck (2015), Aidt and Leon (2016), Caselli and Tesei (2016), Benati et al . (2019), Dorsch and Maarek (2020), and Benati and Guerriero (2021). Our work is most closely related to Brückner and Ciccone (2011).…”

Floods, Droughts, and Environmental Circumscription in Early State Development: The Case of Ancient Egypt

“…The authors argue that this tendency should be understood as a response to the demand for coordinated irrigation facilities in already established communities. Benati and Guerriero (2021) argue that a state was formed in Mesopotamia when adverse production conditions pushed the existing elite to establish a state by giving strong political and property rights to non-elite groups that possessed complementary skills. Carneiro (1970) offered an alternative hypothesis based on coercion and conflict.…”