Clubs of autocrats: Regional organizations and authoritarian survival

Abstract

While scholars have argued that membership in Regional Organizations (ROs) can increase the likelihood of democratization, we see many autocratic regimes surviving in power albeit being members of several ROs. This article argues that this is the case because these regimes are often members in “Clubs of Autocrats” that supply material and ideational resources to strengthen domestic survival politics and shield members from external interference during moments of political turmoil. The argument is supported by survival analysis testing the effect of membership in autocratic ROs on regime survival between 1946 to 2010. It finds that membership in ROs composed of more autocratic member states does in fact raise the likelihood of regime survival by protecting incumbents against democratic challenges such as civil unrest or political dissent. However, autocratic RO membership does not help to prevent regime breakdown due to autocratic challenges like military coups, potentially because these types of threats are less likely to diffuse to other member states. The article thereby adds to our understanding of the limits of democratization and potential reverse effects of international cooperation, and contributes to the literature addressing interdependences of international and domestic politics in autocratic regimes.

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“…Dieser Beitrag unterstreicht Erkenntnis se anderer Arbeiten zur Rolle interna tionaler Akteure in Zentralasien, etwa Marie Debres Aussage zur Institutionali sierung "nicht-interventionistischer Nor men, mit denen Regime vor einer uner wünschten Einflussnahme auf innenpoli tisch heikle Bereiche von außen geschützt werden". 33 Auch Alexander Warkotsch hat auf die Duldung dieses "bereinig ten" Modells der Interaktion hingewie sen. Er merkt an, dass der Mangel an Anreizen, Reformen in der menschlichen Dimension umzusetzen, dazu geführt ha be, dass autoritäre Anführer im ganzen OSZE-Raum -einschließlich Turkmenis tan -von der OSZE finanzierte Liberali sierungsmaßnahmen als Bedrohung der autoritären Stabilität auffassen. 34 Meiner Ansicht nach war es ein Feh ler, autoritäre Politik nicht als Quelle der Unsicherheit zu betrachten.…”

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“…States may be more motivated to sign economic agreements with foreign policy and military allies (Powers, 2004;Long & Leeds, 2006), or with countries that have good reputations (Gray, 2013;Gray & Hicks, 2014). There may also be ideological reasons for which states choose to cooperate with certain partners over others, with some states willing to sign and maintain agreements with autocrats or populists (Debre, 2022(Debre, , 2021bVoeten, 2021). Furthermore, various domestic political dynamics have been found to influence BIT signing, such as attempts to signal competence to domestic audiences in the face of a civil conflict (Billing & Lugg, 2019), or to enhance leadership survival in autocracies (Arias et al, 2018).…”

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