Coalition formation games with separable preferences

Burani, Nadia; Zwicker, William S.

doi:10.1016/s0165-4896(02)00082-3

Cited by 71 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 16 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…the players have the same reciprocal values for each other). For an excellent study of the role of symmetric additive separable preferences for non-emptiness of the core of a hedonic game the reader is referred to Burani and Zwicker (2003).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games

et al. 2004

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games SummaryIn this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are considered. It turns out that the first domain restriction guarantees non-emptiness of the strong core and the second domain restriction ensures non-emptiness of the weak core of the corresponding hedonic games. Moreover, an element of the strong core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial time, while finding an element of the weak core under enemies aversion is NP-hard. We examine also the relationship between our domain restrictions and some sufficient conditions for non-emptiness of the core already known in the literature.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games

et al. 2004

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In particular, they are conspicuous cases of the family of separable preferences over sets, which are commonly used in the analysis of voting situations (Barberà et al 1991;Berga et al 2004;Ju 2003Ju , 2005 and coalition formation games (Burani and Zwicker 2003;Dimitrov et al 2006). They are also prominent examples of additively representable rankings over sets, a special subfamily of separable preferences that also arise in many economic contexts (see, for instance, Alcantud and Arlegi 2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An axiomatic analysis of ranking sets under simple categorization

Alcantud

Arlegi

2011

SERIEs

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper contributes to the axiomatization of additive rules for ranking sets of objects under the psychological principle of categorization. Firstly we proceed with the case where the elements in the sets are categorized into at most three groups, namely good (with value 1), neutral (with value 0), and bad (with value −1). Secondly, we solve the case where there are only good and neutral elements. In both instances the evaluation of the sets is purely additive. Lastly, we show that dropping one of the axioms in our general characterization produces an axiomatization of the more general class of evaluations where good and bad elements are weighted differently. Areas of research in Economics such as committee selection problems, hedonic games and matching are among the ranking sets models where our results could potentially be applied.

show abstract

“…Given a hedonic game, the main interest is then in the existence of outcomes (partitions of the set of players) that are stable in some sense. For example, the focus in (Banerjee et al, 2001;Cechlárová and Romero-Medina, 2001;Cechlarová and Hajduková, 2002;Cechlarová and Hajduková, 2004;Burani and Zwicker, 2003;Alcalde and Revilla, 2004;Dimitrov et al, 2006) is on the existence of core stable partitions, while (Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002) and (Burani and Zwicker, 2003) contain sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash and individually stable partitions as well.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games

Sung

Dimitrov

2006

Theor Decis

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We present a unified look at myopic stability concepts for hedonic games, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition structures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition structures always exist, and present a sufficient condition for the existence of contractually Nash stable coalition structures on the class of separable games. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007coalition formation, hedonic games, separability, taxonomy, C71, A14, D20,

show abstract

Coalition formation games with separable preferences

Cited by 71 publications

References 16 publications

Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games

Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games

An axiomatic analysis of ranking sets under simple categorization

On Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About