Coalition Formation in the European Parliament

Abstract

This article analyzes coalition formation within the European Parliament (EP) under the cooperation procedure through the analysis of a random sample of 100 roll call votes. The authors find that generally, coalitions form on the basis of ideology, not nationality, although they are able to identify some national groups that occasionally vote against the majority of their party group. More interestingly, they find that the political initiative within the EP belongs to the Left and that the majorities required at different stages affect not only the outcomes of votes but also the coalitions that will form. Finally, a slight variation is found in coalition building depending on the subject matter. On the basis of these findings, the authors suggest an alternative interpretation of the conflicts between the Council and EP based on an ideological conflict about more (EP) or less (Council) regulation, as opposed to more or less integration.

Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?

“…There are three distinct lines of response (Gabel & Hix, 2002 [this issue];Hix, 1999aHix, , 1999bHooghe & Marks, 1999, p. 88;Kreppel & Tsebelis, 1999;Marks & Steenbergen, 2002b By and large, our data confirm the third model. Table 2 presents results of multiple ordinary least squares regressions for positioning on general European integration and on six EU policies.…”

Voting Behaviour in the European Parliament and Economic Governance Reform: Does Nationality Matter?

“…Recent studies reinforce previous findings that EP party groups not only occupy the entire range of the left-right spectrum, but also are clearly distinguishable from one another in policy terms (McElroy and Benoit 2011). Furthermore, scholars showed that party groups, rather than nationality, have played a huge role in coalition formation in the EP from its very establishment (Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999;Kreppel 2000).…”

Understanding Political Contestation in the European Union

“…Consequently, legislative actors in the Parliament and national representatives in the council may be constrained by the same Left/Right dimension that structures national politics in EU member states. Kreppel and Tsebelis (1999) find evidence that traditional Left/Right divisions characterize many issues that are debated in the European Parliament and EU political process, while Garrett (1992) has argued that bargaining over institutional reform in the Single European Act was shaped by national preferences concerning the 886 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / October 2002 extent of intervention in the European economy. In both cases, one may argue that political parties in the European Parliament and in national governments will support only reforms that shift the status quo closer to their ideal position along the Left/Right dimension.…”