This article analyzes coalition formation within the European Parliament (EP) under the cooperation procedure through the analysis of a random sample of 100 roll call votes. The authors find that generally, coalitions form on the basis of ideology, not nationality, although they are able to identify some national groups that occasionally vote against the majority of their party group. More interestingly, they find that the political initiative within the EP belongs to the Left and that the majorities required at different stages affect not only the outcomes of votes but also the coalitions that will form. Finally, a slight variation is found in coalition building depending on the subject matter. On the basis of these findings, the authors suggest an alternative interpretation of the conflicts between the Council and EP based on an ideological conflict about more (EP) or less (Council) regulation, as opposed to more or less integration.
This book, first published in 2001, examines the impact of increased legislative power and political authority on the internal development of the European Parliament and the supranational party group system. This is done through an analysis of changes in the hierarchical structures that regulate the internal organization of both the EP as a whole and the individual party groups. In addition, the changing pattern of coalition formation between party groups across time and legislative procedure is analyzed. The trends of internal development examined suggest that the increases in EP power that have occurred since the creation of the cooperation procedure by the Single European Act in 1987 have caused a fundamental shift in the character of the European Parliament as a legislative institution. Prior to 1987 the European Parliament, despite direct election and several small attempts to increase its powers, served primarily as a chamber of debate where much more was discussed than accomplished.
The article analyses the role of the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council in the two main legislative procedures in the European Union: co-operation and co-decision (I). We use the legislative history of some 5,000 parliamentary amendments. These procedures have been the subject of a great deal of theoretical debate. According to conventional wisdom the co-decision procedure increases the powers of the European Parliament. Revisionist approaches, however, suggest that the conditional agenda-setting powers accorded to the Parliament by the co-operation procedure are more important than the veto powers ascribed by co-decision.Our analysis demonstrates not only that both claims are correct, but also why. On the aggregate there is a higher success rate of parliamentary amendments under co-decision (I) than under co-operation, just as the data published by the EP indicate. However, controlling for one of the conditions of conditional agenda setting (agreement by the Commission under co-operation), conditional agenda setting empowers the EP more than veto powers. Finally, control of Commission behaviour in both procedures indicates no difference in acceptance rates between co-operation and co-decision.Our analysis explains why all three points above are true. The answer hinges on the activity of the Commission, which was more hostile to parliamentary amendments during the 1989-94 period (more amendments were rejected during this period than during any other period under both co-operation and co-decision). In addition, the power of the Commission has declined under co-decision (because it can be and is more frequently overruled by the other two players, whether its opinion is positive or negative).Over the last fifteen years the European Union (EU) has completed the unification of its internal market, expanded to include five additional countries, and is in the process of achieving monetary union. Over the same period it has undergone three major constitutional revisions relating to its legislative processes: the Single European Act in 1987, which introduced the co-operation procedure; the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, which introduced the co-decision (I) procedure; and the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 which significantly altered this procedure (co-decision II). During this period the European Parliament (EP) evolved from an almost insignificant and purely consultative assembly to a potentially powerful player in the legislative process with significant independent powers and resources.
This article looks at the development of the two main features of the party system in the European Parliament (EP): the organization of the party groups, and the nature of competition between these groups. On the organizational side, we examine the foundation of the party groups in the Common Assembly and the evolution of party organization from the appointed to the elected Parliament. On the competition side, we focus on the main axis of competition: the relationship between the Party of European Socialists (PES) and the European People's Party (EPP). We develop a set of competition propositions about PES-EPP collusion, and test these arguments in a statistical analysis of PES and EPP roll-call voting since 1979. We conclude that, contrary to what might be expected, the party system in the EP has become more consolidated and more competitive as the powers of the EP have increased. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003.
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