Coalitional Game Theory Based Value Sharing in Energy Communities

Abstract

This paper presents a coalitional game for value sharing in energy communities (ECs). It is proved that the game is super-additive, and the grand coalition effectively increases the global payoff. It is also proved that the model is balanced and thus, it has a nonempty core. This means there always exists at least one value sharing mechanism that makes the grand coalition stable. Therefore, prosumers will always achieve lower bills if they join to form larger ECs. A counterexample is presented to demonstrate that the game is not convex and value sharing based on Shapley values does not necessarily ensure the stability of the coalition. To find a stabilizing value sharing mechanism that belongs to the core of the game, the worst-case excess minimization concept is applied. In this concept, however, size of the optimization problem increases exponentially with respect to the number of members in EC. To make the problem computationally tractable, the idea of clustering members based on their generation/load profiles and considering the same profile and share for members in the same cluster is proposed here. K-means algorithm is used for clustering prosumers' profiles. This way, the problem would have several redundant constraints that can be removed. The redundant constraints are identified and removed via the generalized Llewellyn's rules. Finally, value sharing in an apartment building in the southern part of Finland in the metropolitan area is studied to demonstrate effectiveness of the method.

Efficient methods for approximating the Shapley value for asset sharing in energy communities

“…Chiş and Koivunen [14] propose a coalitional cost-game optimisation of a portfolio of energy assets using Shapley value as the underlying redistribution method, modelling a realistic case study of 9 households. Safdarian et al [15] use the Shapley value for coalition-based value sharing in energy communities, modelling an energy community in southern Finland with up to 24 apartments. Vespermann et al [16] study the market design of a local energy community with shared storage and consider a number of solution concepts such as the nucleolus and Shapley values.…”

Financial Optimization of Renewable Energy Communities Through Optimal Allocation of Locally Generated Electricity

“…Electricity Supplier Physical Exchanges Financial Exchanges Centralised Decentralised Unique supplier Each prosumer chooses [8], [28] Cooperative game X X X [17] Multilateral trades X X X [18] Cooperative & non-cooperative game X X X [20], [21] Multi-bilateral dispatch X X X [22] Bilateral contracts X X X [23]- [25] Non-cooperative game X X X [26], [27] Cooperative game X X X [31] Rule-based internal market X X X [32] Bi-level optimisation clearing internal market X X X [33] Ex-post optimisation with sharing rule X X X [34] Optimisation of bilateral trading, balancing and ancillary services X X X [35], [36] Multiobjective optimisation X X X [37] Double-sided auction for buyers and sellers X X X [38] Alternative direction method of multipliers X X X [39], [40] Hybrid P2P & Community trading X X X [41] Bilevel optimisation X X X [42] Day-ahead scheduling optimisation X X X [43] Cooperative game X X X…”

“…This coalitional framework is further explored and developed in [27] by the same authors. Also employing a coalitional game, Safdarian et al [28] simulate an REC in an apartment building where a clustering technique groups the consumers in different clusters to attain savings in their electricity costs. Tushar et al [18] extensively address the topic of P2P energy management using game theory, comparing several models for managing P2P networks and highlighting the main criteria to be considered when designing such problems.…”

Optimal Coordination and Discount Allocation in Residential Renewable Energy Communities with Smart Home Appliances

“…In [2] and [3], peer-to-peer trading strategies among community members that act as prosumers are proposed. In [4], [5], coalitional game-based methods are proposed to optimally manage a REC that interfaces with the energy market as a unique entity. In [6], a fully decentralized cooperative energy market is defined into a community of smart buildings using block-chain smart contracts.…”