Coercive Enforcement of International Law

Thompson, Alexander

doi:10.1017/cbo9781139107310.025

Cited by 23 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 87 publications

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“…Moreover, the great power structure, failed representativeness, secrecy, and the unwillingness to reform of the UNSC undermines the ‘myth of collectivity’ on which UN legitimacy is built (Hurd, 2002, 48). This enables targets to reject also UNSC sanctions as punitive actions from ‘the outside’ (Thompson, 2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regional sanctions and the struggle for democracy: Introduction to the special issue

Hellquist

Palestini

2020

International Political Science Review

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Regional organisations (ROs) around the world increasingly use sanctions against member states in situations of democratic crisis. This special issue unpacks the trend of RO sanctions in regions that are both democracy-dense (Europe and the Americas) and autocracy-dense (Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East). We argue that regional sanctions cannot be taken at face value as instruments of democracy promotion. Instead, the politics of regional sanctions unveil controversies over the substance and limits of democracy, as well as over practical processes of regional interference in a sphere that is at the core of ‘domestic affairs’. In this introductory article, we situate the special issue at the crossroads of debates within comparative regionalism, sanctions, and democracy/autocracy promotion, and discuss how the membership premise crucially distinguishes RO measures from foreign policy and United Nations (UN) sanctions.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regional sanctions and the struggle for democracy: Introduction to the special issue

Hellquist

Palestini

2020

International Political Science Review

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“…Investor-State arbitration decidedly provides the opportunity for a foreign investor to take legal action against a receiving State, aimed at compensation for possible losses in expected profit or violation of due process, according to the rules for protection of the investment established in the agreement between the Parties. Thus, investor-State arbitration, as a mechanism of observance, allows the real imposition of costs or threat thereof 39 for the State purportedly violating the prerogatives provided in the agreement, sometimes, to the detriment of the social nature assigned to the government measures then considered as infringements 40,41,42,43,44 .…”

Section: Foreign Investment and Regulatory Chillmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dilemas na implementação da Convenção-Quadro para o Controle do Tabaco da Organização Mundial da Saúde

2020

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O artigo analisa alguns dilemas relacionados à implementação da Convenção-Quadro para o Controle do Tabaco, destacando as dificuldades dos Estados participantes para adotar políticas públicas, com custo-benefício comprovado, que visam à redução da oferta e demanda do tabaco. Especificamente, o artigo examina a recomendação para a adoção de políticas de padronização das embalagens de cigarro, presente nas diretrizes para a implementação dos Artigos 11 e 13 da Convenção. Por meio da análise de casos, identificamos fatores políticos e jurídicos que dificultam a implementação da Convenção, incluindo a inibição regulatória produzida pela abertura de litígios por parte da indústria do tabaco, que utiliza-se das cláusulas de arbitragem investidor-Estado existentes em acordos bilaterais de investimentos. Conclui-se que, apesar dos custos impostos aos Estados e dos atrasos na adoção dessas políticas, no médio ou longo prazo, as decisões proferidas pelos tribunais arbitrais e pelo Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias da Organização Mundial do Comércio podem consolidar o entendimento acerca da legalidade e efetividade de políticas que adotam o referido modelo.

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“…A common perception among political scientists is that the management vs. enforcement debate was essentially "won" by the enforcement side, which demonstrated the limited use of management techniques in precisely those situations where compliance was most problematic -as well as the naiveté of IL scholars. As Alexander Thompson (2012) has recently argued, however, the "debate" formulation of the literature creates a tendency "to overlook the extent to which these arguments are complementary. "…”

Section: Compliance and Effectivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%