“…The main result of this paper, Theorem 3, is that in the email game there exists a 2 See Nagel (1995); Stahl andWilson (1994, 1995); Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt (1998); Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001); Camerer (2003) ;Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004); Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006); Crawford and Iriberri (2007a,b); Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich (2008); Crawford, Kugler, Neeman, and Pauzner (2009) ;Healy, Georganas, and Weber (2010). finite number of messages such that coordination is possible among all "cognitive types," no matter how high their bound, provided that they receive at least that many messages.…”