Cognitive adaptation and its consequences: a test of cognitive continuum theory

Dunwoody, Philip T.; Haarbauer, Eric; Mahan, Robert P.; Marino, C. P.; Tang, Chu‐Chun

doi:10.1002/(sici)1099-0771(200001/03)13:1<35::aid-bdm339>3.3.co;2-l

Cited by 19 publications

(38 citation statements)

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“…There is some evidence that in the absence of external input people tend to rely on more "intuitive" rather than analytical decision-making ( (Brunswick, 1956;Hammond, 1988;Dunwoody et al, 2000). While the expertise literature tends to equate intuition with a semi-automatic form of information processing arising out of deliberate practice (Ericsson and Smith, 1991;Ericsson and Charness, 1994), others have operationalized it as tacit knowledge that might have a variety of origins including socially and culturally instantiated knowledge structures (example: (Reber, 1989)).…”

Section: Weighting Of (Predictive) Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effectual versus predictive logics in entrepreneurial decision-making: Differences between experts and novices

Dew

Read

Sarasvathy

et al. 2009

Journal of Business Venturing

609

428

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Section: Weighting Of (Predictive) Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effectual versus predictive logics in entrepreneurial decision-making: Differences between experts and novices

Dew

Read

Sarasvathy

et al. 2009

Journal of Business Venturing

609

428

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“…The properties of reasoning (e.g., cognitive control, awareness of cognitive ability, speed of cognitive activity) vary in degree, and the structural features of the tasks that invoke reasoning processes also vary along the continuum, according to the degree of cognitive activity they are predicted to induce (Dunwoody, Haarbauer, Mahan, Marino, & Tang, 2000). Hammond claims that the advantage of his approach, as an alternative to a dichotomous one, is that it is parsimonious because it accommodates a broader range of processing within a single-system framework.…”

Section: Appraisal Of Dual-process Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

An evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning

Osman

2004

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

349

252

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“…According to Hammond's (1996Hammond's ( , 2000 cognitive continuum theory, some of these task properties may lead people to abandon analytic thought and move to quasi-rational or intuitive cognition (see Dhami & Thomson, 2012; see also Dhami, Belton, & Goodman-Delahunty, 2015). Empirical evidence supports these claims (e.g., Dunwoody, Haarbauer, Mahan, Marino, & Tang, 2000;Hamm, 1988;Hammond et al, 1987).…”

Section: Analyze Individual Judges' Decision Data Using Psychologicalmentioning

confidence: 99%

On getting inside the judge’s mind.

Dhami¹,

Belton²

2017

Translational Issues in Psychological Science

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According to the scales of justice, the judge, in an unbiased way and directed by law, attends to all of the available information in a case, weighs it according to its significance, and integrates it to make a decision. By contrast, research suggests that judicial decision-making departs from the cognitive balancing act depicted by the scales of justice. Nevertheless, the research is often dismissed as irrelevant, and the judiciary, legal policymakers and the public remain largely unconvinced that the status quo needs improving. One potential rebuttal to the scientific findings is that they lack validity because researchers did not study judges making decisions on real cases. Another potential argument is that researchers have not pinpointed the psychological processes of any specific judge because they analyzed data over judges and/or used statistical models lacking in psychological plausibility. We review these 2 grounds for appeal against the scientific research on judicial decision-making, and note that it appears researchers' choices of data collection methods and analytic techniques may, indeed, be inappropriate for understanding the phenomena. We offer 2 remedies from the sphere of decision-making research: collecting data on judicial decision-making using representative design, and analyzing judicial decision data using more psychologically plausible models. Used together, we believe these solutions can help researchers better understand and improve legal decision-making. What is the significance of this article for the general public?We propose that researchers studying judicial decision-making ought to examine decisions made on real(istic) cases using a representative experimental design, and they should analyze individual judge or bench decision data using psychologically plausible models. This will make the research more relevant to the judiciary and thus make it more difficult for judges and legal policy-makers to ignore the findings.

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Cognitive adaptation and its consequences: a test of cognitive continuum theory

Cited by 19 publications

References 0 publications

Effectual versus predictive logics in entrepreneurial decision-making: Differences between experts and novices

Effectual versus predictive logics in entrepreneurial decision-making: Differences between experts and novices

An evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning

On getting inside the judge’s mind.

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