Collaborating agents: Values, sociality, and moral responsibility

Abstract

I respond to the Behavioral and Brain Sciences commentaries on my book, Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency. I defend and amend both the skeptical challenge to morally responsible agency, that is, the book's impetus, and the anti-skeptical theory I develop to address that challenge. Regarding the skeptical challenge, I argue that it must be taken more seriously than some of my sanguine commentators assert, and consider some ways its impact might be blunted, such as by appeal to individual differences and the practical efficacy of human behavior. Regarding my positive theory, I defend the role of values in morally responsible agency against numerous criticisms, and consider various suggestions for elaborating my social, “collaborativist” account of morally responsible agency. In closing, I comment on the appropriate aspirations for theorizing about moral responsibility and agency.

Compassion and Skillful Means: Cultural Adaptation, Psychological Science, and Creative Responsiveness

“…2 As Varela (1999) stated, ethical know-how is cultivated not through rote learning of moral principles, but rather through participating in communities that embody such wise expressions of care. Similarly, as the philosopher John Doris has stated (Doris, 2018;Doris & Nichols, 2012), virtues are not necessarily a sign of inherent character, but rather they are better understood as qualities that are collaboratively generated and sustained.…”

Compassion and skillful means: Cultural adaptation, psychological science, and creative responsiveness

“…As Varela (1999) stated, ethical know-how is cultivated not through rote learning of moral principles, but rather through participating in communities that embody such wise expressions of care. As the philosopher John Doris has stated (Doris, 2018;Doris & Nichols, 2012), virtues are not necessarily a sign of inherent character, but rather they are better understood as qualities that are collaboratively generated and sustained.…”

Cautiously optimistic rationalism may not be cautious enough

“…contends that the arguments I make in Doris [2015] are subject to a fatal dilemma. I have [Doris 2018] contested this elsewhere.) When I was espousing situationist character skepticism, my target was a particular conception of character traits, understood as issuing in cross-situationally consistent behavior.…”