Collaboration and sharing mechanisms in improving corporate social responsibility

Wu, Cheng-Han

doi:10.1007/s10100-014-0377-0

Cited by 22 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…By substituting Equation 12into Equation 2, and according to boundary condition of state equation, G(0) = G 0 , the optimal trajectory expression of supply chain reputation can be obtained as shown in Proposition 1 3 . Finally, by substituting Equation (12) into Equation 7, we can get the optimal value function of the overall profit of the supply chain, as shown in Proposition 1 4 .…”

Section: Basic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Dominating types of supply chain studied include two-echelon supply chain, three-echelon supply chain, and closed-loop (reverse) supply chain [4][5][6][7][8]. In order to achieve supply chain coordination and improve the performance level of CSR, supply chain enterprises will adopt some contractual methods to meet the needs of all parties, such as two-part pricing, revenue-sharing, cost-sharing [9][10][11][12][13]. Cruz (2013) proposed a comprehensive supply chain decision-making model based on CSR, trying to capture the potential supply chain disruption risk, social risk, and demand uncertainty risk in the supply chain [14].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Incentive Decision for Supply Chain with Corporate Social Responsibility and Lag Effect

Cheng

Huang

2020

Sustainability

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With the deepening of economic globalization and international division of labor, enterprises gradually turn to supply chain management methods that aiming at win-win cooperation. An enterprise’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) behaviors will affect the interests of other enterprises in the supply chain through transmission, diffusion, amplification, feedback, etc. Therefore, scholars are currently focusing on helping supply chain enterprises to take social responsibility. This paper takes a two-echelon supply chain as an example, which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. Considering the influence of lag effect on the performance level of corporate social responsibility, we discuss the optimal strategy of corporate social responsibility in supply chain under centralized and decentralized decision-making. Three incentive models are proposed to improve the implementation effect of decentralized supply chain decision. Study finds that, in real life, decentralized supply chain is more in line with the decision-making mode of supply chain participants, even though centralized decision-making has better operation effect. Under certain circumstances, the mixed contract, which is composed of advertising cooperation, cost sharing and revenue sharing, could lead to supply chain coordination. As an external stakeholder, the government’s subsidy plays a positive role in promoting the fulfillment of corporate social responsibility. Multi-subsidy performs better than single-subsidy. Although the time lag promotes the manufacturer’s social responsibility efforts and the retailer’s advertising, it somehow compromises overall profit of the supply chain. Therefore, manufacturers should try to reduce the lag effect to maintain the overall profitability of the supply chain.

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Section: Basic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive Decision for Supply Chain with Corporate Social Responsibility and Lag Effect

Cheng

Huang

2020

Sustainability

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“…In terms of cost sharing, Hsueh and Chang () discussed the coordination problems of the supply chain network with CSR composed of manufacturers, distributors, and retailers and realize the optimization of the channels by using currency transfer to share CSR. Wu () derive and characterize the consumer valuation and the firm decisions at equilibrium with respect to the changes in the sharing scheme and further identify the impacts of each sharing mechanism. Liu, Quan, Li, and Forrest () designed a CSR cost‐sharing mechanism to coordinate the supply chain, motivate supply chain members to actively assume social responsibility, and optimize the overall profitability of the supply chain.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A coordination mechanism through value‐added profit distribution in a supply chain considering corporate social responsibility

Liu

2019

Manage Decis Econ

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The consumers pay more and more attention to corporate social responsibility (CSR), which has been a new competitiveness for the enterprises. This paper constructs a supply chain consisting of a dominated retailer, a socially responsible supplier and a non-socially responsible supplier (compared with the socially responsible supplier), consider the consumer preference and exploit the game analysis technique to analyze the optimal decisions under the decentralized and concentrated decision, and then design a coordination mechanism based on value-added profit distribution. The results show that compared with the decentralized decision, the retail price and order quantity of two products are lower, the CSR effort degree of socially responsible supplier is higher, and the performance of the whole supply chain is better under the concentrated decision. In addition, the mechanism designed can induce the socially responsible supplier to undertake CSR without damaging its profit, prompt the supply chain members to make the concentrated decisions, and promote the competitiveness of the retailer-dominated supply chain.

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“…Panda et al (2015) has studied channel coordination in a three-level social responsibility supply chain. CSR can also be defined in other terms such as in Wu (2015), where it has been defined as the variable affecting demand function in a two-level supply chain, or in Ni et al (2012), in which CSR costs have been considered for the manufacturer and retailer. These costs have an impact on the demand function and channel profit function.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effect of promotional cost sharing on the decisions of two-level supply chain with uncertain demand

2018

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In much of today's competitive marketplace, consumers have the opportunity to choose where they spend their money based on their examination of a company's corporate social responsibility (CSR). A company's social reputation and its promotional efforts may influence consumer choice. Sustainable development is highly regarded by governments, experts, decision-makers and managers in organizations and two-level supply chains. This supply chain includes a manufacturer (acting as leader) and a retailer (acting as follower), both of whom face demand uncertainty. In this article, the cost of advertising is considered in two ways for the manufacturer and the retailer. In the first model, the retailer determines the optimal retail price and order quantity, and the manufacturer determines the optimal wholesale price and the promotional efforts value so that their profits are maximized. In the second model, the retailer determines the optimal retail price, order quantity, and promotional efforts value, and the manufacturer determines the optimal wholesale price. We will also study the impact of promotional cost sharing on the coordination of the supply chain and the issue will be further explained with numerical examples. Therefore, in this research, the simultaneous effect of increased advertising and value consumer surplus is studied We examine cases when the retailer is a provider of promotional cost and profit, when consumer surplus is directed toward the retailer, and when both retailer and manufacturer achieve higher profits than when the manufacturer is responsible for promotional cost and profit.

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Collaboration and sharing mechanisms in improving corporate social responsibility

Cited by 22 publications

References 44 publications

Incentive Decision for Supply Chain with Corporate Social Responsibility and Lag Effect

Incentive Decision for Supply Chain with Corporate Social Responsibility and Lag Effect

A coordination mechanism through value‐added profit distribution in a supply chain considering corporate social responsibility

The effect of promotional cost sharing on the decisions of two-level supply chain with uncertain demand

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