Collaboration in security assessments for critical infrastructures

Koster, Friedrich; Klaas, Michael; Nguyen, Hanh Quyen; Brandle, Markus; Obermeier, Sebastian; Brenne, Walter

doi:10.1109/cris.2009.5071499

Cited by 5 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…In the ICS domain, some papers already address the ICS security knowledge. However many of them do not cover the full scope of ICS security assessments (Oates et al, 2013;Schneider, Obermeier and Schlegl, 2015;Lemaire et al, 2015;Lemaire et al, 2014), and others focus on special applications of ICS like smart grids and critical infrastructures (Choraś et al, 2010a; Jarmakiewicz, Maslanka and Parobczak, 2015; Barnett and Crapo, 2011;Koster et al, 2009). Additionally some general papers, dealing with ICS, do not embrace (all) ICS requirements (Bouet and Israel, 2011;Choraś et al, 2010b).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For complexity reduction reasons, not all elements are shown. An asset is the concept which represents all goods to be protected (Fenz and Ekelhart, 2009;Koster et al, 2009;ISA, 2015a). Assets are owned by an enterprise and represent its resources (Fenz and Ekelhart, 2009;Singhal and Wijesekera, 2010;ISA, 2015a).…”

Section: Middle Ontology Layermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Not every resource is an asset. Every asset has security objects to achieve (Koster et al, 2009;Miede et al, 2010), which are protected by a control, which itself is an asset, too (Aime and Guasconi, 2010;Souag et al, 2015;Choraś et al, 2010a). Controls can be of different types (Fenz and Ekelhart, 2009) and are generally separated in physical, technical or organisational.…”

Section: Middle Ontology Layermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Controls can be of different types (Fenz and Ekelhart, 2009) and are generally separated in physical, technical or organisational. Controls are part of a defense strategy (Herzog, Shahmehri and Duma, 2007;Koster et al, 2009). The defense strategy contains all concepts of how to defend an information system.…”

Section: Middle Ontology Layermentioning

confidence: 99%

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Ontology and life cycle of knowledge for ICS security assessments

Tebbe¹,

Niemann²,

Fay

2016

Electronic Workshops in Computing

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Industrial Control Systems (ICS) succumb to an ever evolving variety of threats. Additionally, threats are increasing in number and get more complex. This requires a holistic and up-to-date security concept for ICS as a whole. Usually security concepts are applied and updated based on regularly performed ICS security assessments. Such ICS security assessments require high effort and extensive knowledge about ICS and its security. This is often a problem for small and mediumsized enterprises (SME), which do not have sufficient respective sufficiently skilled human resources. This paper defines in a first step requirements on the knowledge needed to perform an ICS security assessment and the life cycle of this knowledge. Afterwards the ICS security knowledge and its life cycle are developed and discussed considering the requirements and related work.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Middle Ontology Layermentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Middle Ontology Layermentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Middle Ontology Layermentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Ontology and life cycle of knowledge for ICS security assessments

Tebbe¹,

Niemann²,

Fay

2016

Electronic Workshops in Computing

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Security risk assessment for industrial automation systems currently focuses on software parts of the system, with little research that also considers the impact on the physical systems being controlled [12]. One approach integrating the automation system and electric power networks is presented by Ten et al [13], but impact assessment is limited to quantifying lost load from disconnected substations.…”

Section: Security Impact Assessment Of Industrial Automation Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security impact assessment of industrial automation systems using genetic algorithm and simulation

Papakonstantinou

Sierla

Charitoudi

et al. 2014

Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE Emerging Technology and Factory Automation (ETFA)

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Much of the research on security of industrial automation systems has focused on countermeasures such as intrusion detection, certificate management or public key infrastructures. Due to limited resources, countermeasures should be focused to prevent the attacks with highest potential for damage. The impact of an attack can only be determined through a detailed analysis of the interactions of the automation system and the physical system under control. Attacks against single components are similar to ordinary component failures, so our focus is on deliberate damage to several components, since such scenarios are not considered in reliability engineering methods used for industrial automation systems. A simulation based security impact assessment method is proposed, using genetic algorithms to explore the range of possible attacks.

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An Agent-Based Socio-Technical Approach to Impact Assessment for Cyber Defense

Charitoudi

Blyth

2014

Information Security Journal: A Global Perspective

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Collaboration in security assessments for critical infrastructures

Cited by 5 publications

References 11 publications

Ontology and life cycle of knowledge for ICS security assessments

Ontology and life cycle of knowledge for ICS security assessments

Security impact assessment of industrial automation systems using genetic algorithm and simulation

An Agent-Based Socio-Technical Approach to Impact Assessment for Cyber Defense

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