Collective Actors without Collective Minds

Salas, Javier González de Prado; Zamora-Bonilla, Jesús

doi:10.1177/0048393113520397

Cited by 14 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…The prepositional 'in,' in the context of 'in mind,' as a way of speaking about content, becomes, on the present account, an issue about what responsibilities a doing follows from and what responsibilities follow from it according to socially articulated inferential norms (an issue about deontological position; cf. Brandom, 2004;Steiner, 2014;de Prado Salas & Zamora-Bonilla, 2015;In press). This is a turn away from the issue where in the world mind is, as well as from the issue how it can reach beyond itself.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Individuality, Collectivity and the Intersubjective Constitution of Intentionality

Presti¹

2020

AVANT

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This paper argues that first-person singular I-and first-person plural we-intentionality are constituted in normative second-person relations. Their relata are individuals who mutually recognize each other as loci of responsibility. Such relations constitute an I-You, which is argued to be sufficient for both singular I-and plural we-intentionality. Whenever there is I-intentionality there is we-intentionality, because whenever the relevant second-person relations obtain, conditions sufficient for both are satisfied. Consequently, the possibility of autonomous individual I-intentionality as well as plurally shared we-intentionality depends on at least two individuals involved in normative mutual recognition. Neither individual is an intentional 'I' independently of entering the I-You, and when they do so they are an intentional 'we.'

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Individuality, Collectivity and the Intersubjective Constitution of Intentionality

Presti¹

2020

AVANT

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“…7 It should be clear that this problem arises only for intentional realists, as they are committed to understand the intentional states attributed to both individual and collective agents as a specific kind of psychological state. In a recent paper, de Prado Salas and Zamora-Bonilla (2015) show that the problem evaporates in a pragmatist framework, where attributing an intentional state is understood as attributing a deontic status, because collective intentionality only requires in this case that a practice exists according to which entitlements and commitments can be attributed to collectives.…”

Section: Joint Attentionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons

Bianchin

2015

Philosophy of the Social Sciences

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In this article, I argue that a capacity for mindreading conceived along the line of simulation theory provides the cognitive basis for forming we-centric representations of actions and goals. This explains the plural first personal stance displayed by we-intentions in terms of the underlying cognitive processes performed by individual minds, while preserving the idea that they cannot be analyzed in terms of individual intentional states. The implication for social ontology is that this makes sense of the plural subjectivity of joint actions without making group agents require either a corporate body or the unity of consciousness.

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“…No obstante, la teoría inferencialista puede extenderse para dar cabida a compromisos discursivos adquiridos por agentes colectivos (González de Prado y Zamora Bonilla, 2014). Las prácticas sociales humanas incluyen acciones que son atribuidas a entidades colectivas, por ejemplo un banco, un gobierno o un equipo deportivo.…”

Section: Una Teoría Inferencialista Del Conocimientounclassified

Un análisis inferencialista de la co-autoría de artículos científicos

Zamora-Bonilla¹,

Salas²

2014

Rev. esp. doc. cient.

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Cómo citar este artículo/Citation: Zamora-Bonilla, J.; González de Prado Salas, J. (2014). Un análisis inferencialista de la co-autoría de artículos científicos. Revista Española de Documentación Científica, 37(4): e064. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/ redc.2014.4.1145Resumen: La co-autoría es muy frecuente en la mayor parte de las áreas científicas. Sin embargo, la autoría plural tiende a complicar la atribución de mérito a cada científico individual (una atribución que es la base de la evaluación científica). En este artículo, argumentamos que la colaboración no implica necesariamente co-autoría: cada autor podría publicar en artículos separados su contribución individual al proyecto colaborativo (o los artículos conjuntos podrían especificar la contribución individual de cada autor). La cuestión que nos planteamos en este artículo es por qué los científicos prefieren fusionar sus contribuciones en lugar de mantenerlas separadas -teniendo en cuenta que su objetivo es, entre otras cosas, el reconocimiento individual -. Nuestra respuesta, enmarcada en una visión inferencialista de la práctica científica, se basa en la idea de que los artículos científicos han de ser vistos como argumentos, en vez de como colecciones de conocimiento.Palabras clave: Coautoría; colaboración científica; reputación; epistemología social; inferencialismo; instituciones; propiedad intelectual; argumentación. An inferentialist conception regarding the co-authorship of scientific papersAbstract: Co-authorship is very common in most areas of science and has grown as the complexity of research has increased the need for scientific collaboration. But plural authorship tends to complicate the attribution of merit to individual scientists, which is the basis of scientific evaluation. I argue that collaboration does not necessarily entail co-authorship, though in many cases the latter is an option that the individual scientists might not choose, at least in principle: individually authors might separately publish their own contribution to a collaborative project in which they had taken part, or papers could explicitly state what contribution each individual author had made. I ask, hence, why it is that scientists prefer to 'pool' their contributions instead of keeping them separate if they are pursuing, amongst other things, individual recognition. My answer, following an inferentialist approach to scientific knowledge, is based on the view of the scientific paper as a piece of argumentation rather than as a piece of knowledge.

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Collective Actors without Collective Minds

Cited by 14 publications

References 21 publications

Individuality, Collectivity and the Intersubjective Constitution of Intentionality

Individuality, Collectivity and the Intersubjective Constitution of Intentionality

Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons

Un análisis inferencialista de la co-autoría de artículos científicos

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