Collective Bargaining in theCanadian Public Sector, 1978–2008: The Consequences of Restraint and Structural Change

Abstract

We study public‐sector bargaining and contract outcomes using Canadian data from 1978 to 2008. We have a number of interesting results, but our principal findings are from our analysis of wage settlements. We find that the essential services designation, which only allows non‐essential members of a bargain unit to strike, is associated with decreases in wages. Our estimates also suggest that there is an arbitration wage premium and that making adjustments to the ability to pay criterion used by arbitrators to determine awards does not affect this premium. We also discuss the implications of our estimates.

Time to Tweak or Re-Boot? Assessing the Interest Arbitration Process in Canadian Industrial Relations

“…18 There are, however, some issues of concern with the essential services designation model. Campolieti, Hebdon, and Dachis (2016) find that this model is associated with reduced wages, while Adell, Grant, and Ponak (2001) suggest that it could increase both the frequency and duration of strikes. Strikes might occur more often as unions adapt to the model by substituting tactics such as rotating strikes or work-to-rule in place of a full strike.…”

“…In the broader public sector, in contrast, the pre-eminent goal of a system of interest arbitration is the maintenance of the provision of essential services by ensuring industrial peace through avoiding strikes that are considered to pose too high a risk to the health and safety of the public. With regard to this goal, the use of compulsory arbitration, in lieu of the right to strike, does appear to reduce strike frequency when compared to other legal structures (Campolieti, Hebdon, and Dachis 2016;Currie andMcConnell 1991, 1994).…”

“…5 It is generally believed that steps to reduce the predictability of interest arbitration outcomes for the parties will further this goal of inducing voluntary settlement. With regard to this goal, current arbitration again appears to fall short, as compulsory arbitration legal structures have been shown to produce greater rates of impasse (fewer bargaining settlements) than do legal structures that specify other dispute resolution procedures as the terminal step (Anderson and Kochan 1977;Campolieti, Hebdon, and Dachis 2016;Currie 1989;Hebdon and Mazerolle 2003;Rose and Piczak 1996).…”

“…However, although the lesser cost of arbitration is often highlighted as an advantage of the process, in the context of public-sector labour relations an arbitration regime might inhibit bargaining efficiency by slowing the speed of the process. Not only are compulsory arbitration regimes associated with higher rates of impasse or dispute, but arbitration hearings -with the requisite time and resources devoted to preparation, hearings, and the arbitrator's issuing of the award -are likely to take much longer than the average public-sector strike duration, over the 1978-2008 period, of 32.5 days (Campolieti, Hebdon, and Dachis 2016). Arbitration, therefore, appears to fulfill the goal of efficiency with respect to cost, but falls short when it comes to enhancing the time to produce a settlement.…”

A Roadmap to Municipal Reform: Improving Life in Canadian Cities

“…Articles by Dachis and Hebdon (2010) and by Campolieti, Hebdon, and Dachis (2014) use detailed data on every major Canadian public-sector bargaining and contract outcome from 1978 to 2008. To assess the effect of the legislation, we authors used regression analyses to estimate its effect on the probability of a work stoppage occurring, on wages, and on the length of work stoppages when they occur.…”