Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures

Gilligan, Thomas W.; Krehbiel, Keith

doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036932

Cited by 184 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…The second role has not been extensively studied in the literature and is reminiscent of the idea that the agenda setter's proposal can reflect private information about the underlying state (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987). However, it has the same effect as buying access to any other legislator described in Proposition 4.…”

Section: Privately Lobbying the Agenda-settermentioning

confidence: 99%

Persuasive Lobbying and the Value of Connections

Awad¹,

Minaudier²

2023

Preprint

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Interest groups are often highly selective regarding which policymakers to meet and when to meet them. How valuable are private meetings with policymakers as a function of their preferences and bargaining power, and when do interest group prefer access early or late in the legislative process? To answer these questions, we study a model of informational lobbying with a collective decision-making body and endogenous reforms. We show that the value of gaining private access to legislators depends not only on their ideological alignment with the interest group, but also on their ideological alignment with the median of the legislature and with the agenda setter. Moreover, the value of access to a particular legislator depends on the ideological alignment between the median and the agenda setter, even when that legislator is neither of them. Finally, we show that the agenda setter herself may not be a particularly valuable target and that she can be influenced by a simple cheap talk recommendation even though the interest group has transparent motives.

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Section: Privately Lobbying the Agenda-settermentioning

confidence: 99%

Persuasive Lobbying and the Value of Connections

Awad¹,

Minaudier²

2023

Preprint

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“…Theories of legislative organization illuminate the reasons committee membership affects speech participation. Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) started from the premise that specialization by committees helps the chamber obtain information about the consequences of alternative policies. Consequently, it makes sense for legislatures to coordinate committee appointments considering their members' talents-who can specialize at a low cost due to their prior experience or interest (Krehbiel 1991, 136).…”

Section: Speech Participationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Informational theories, which originated in the study of the U.S. Congress, build upon the observation that legislatures address a variety of complex policy matters and that members of congress differ in their competencies and inclinations to tackle the various issues they face (Krehbiel 2004). Thus, the standing committee system was developed to meet the challenge of organizing legislative business in a way that taps the expertise of legislators and fosters specialization (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987;Krehbiel 1991). One expectation from this theoretical perspective is that effective legislatures will induce committees to specialize and share policyrelevant information with the chamber.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Congressional Committees, Electoral Connections, and Legislative Speech

Alemán

Micozzi

Vera

2022

Political Research Quarterly

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This article examines the effects of committee specialization and district characteristics on speech participation by topic and congressional forum. It argues that committee specialization should increase speech participation during legislative debates, while district characteristics should affect the likelihood of speech participation in non-lawmaking forums. To examine these expectations, we analyze over 100,000 speeches delivered in the Chilean Chamber of Deputies between 1990 and 2018. To carry out our topic classification task, we utilize the recently developed state-of-the-art multilingual Transformer model XLM-RoBERTa. Consistent with informational theories, we find that committee specialization is a significant predictor of speech participation in legislative debates. In addition, consistent with theories purporting that legislative speech serves as a vehicle for the electoral connection, we find that district characteristics have a significant effect on speech participation in non-lawmaking forums.

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“…The literature on committee design in countries with programmatic parties assumes that programmatic parties design committees to help develop well-designed, ideologically based public goods. According to the informational theory of committee system design, legislators design committees so that committee members can become experts in a policy area (Fenno, 1973; Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987). The distributive theory also suggests that legislators design committees so that each committee has the power to develop local public goods that they can distribute to particular types of constituencies or groups.…”

Section: Party Linkages and Executive-legislative Relationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The impact of party-constituent relationships on executive and legislative influence over policymaking

VanDusky-Allen

Kettler

2021

Party Politics

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In this analysis, we examine the effect of party-voter linkages on executive and legislative influence over policymaking in democracies throughout the world. We expect committees in legislatures with programmatic parties to have more power over the public policymaking process than committees in legislatures with clientelistic parties do. We also expect executives in countries with programmatic parties to have less power over the public policymaking process than executives in countries with clientelistic parties do. Using data from the Varieties of Democracy Dataset and controlling for relevant factors, we find support for our expectations. The results of this paper shed light on how party linkages to constituents can affect executive and legislative influence over policymaking.

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Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures

Cited by 184 publications

References 24 publications

Persuasive Lobbying and the Value of Connections

Persuasive Lobbying and the Value of Connections

Congressional Committees, Electoral Connections, and Legislative Speech

The impact of party-constituent relationships on executive and legislative influence over policymaking

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