Collusion, Co-Optation, or Evasion: The Politics of Drug Trafficking Violence in Central America

Abstract

Why do drug traffickers sometimes decide to use violence, but other times demonstrate restraint? Building on recent work on the politics of drug violence, this article explores how Central American drug trafficking organizations’ strategies impact their use of violence. I argue that three inter-related political factors—corruption, electoral competition, and the politicization of the security apparatus—collectively determine the type of relationship between traffickers and the state that will emerge. That relationship, in turn, determines the primary strategy used by traffickers in that country. Drawing on over two years of comparative ethnographic fieldwork in key transshipment points along the Caribbean coast of Central America, I show how co-optation strategies in Honduras have resulted in high levels of violence, evasion strategies in Costa Rica have produced moderate levels of violence, and collusion strategies in Nicaragua have generated the lowest levels of drug-related violence.

Pandemic Micropolitics in Latin America: Small Business and the Governance of Crisis From Above and Below in El Salvador

“…Here, formal governance from above may be met with oppositional forms of community and non-state governance from below, reconstructing or rearticulating the practices of governance within local communities (Lea and Stenson, 2007;Stenson, 2008). Yet such encounters may also be "cooperative" forms of co-governance, such as where states and criminal groups share the responsibilities to govern through pacts or agreements (Arias, 2017;Blume, 2022;Cruz and Durán-Martínez, 2016). For instance, Lessing argues that criminal governance, "the imposition of rules and restrictions by an armed criminal group," is embedded in spheres of state power, and thus simultaneously born of, shaped by, in opposition tobut in subtle ways complementingstate power (Lessing, 2021: 857).…”

“…Parsing this, we argue that in pursuit of legitimacy and political support, the pandemic led to shifts in constraints and opportunities regarding how both State and non-state actors sought to formally or informally govern. Drawing on theories of governance from above and below (Lea and Stenson, 2007), and State and criminal co-governance of territories, markets and populations in Latin America (Arias, 2017; Blume, 2022; Cruz and Durán-Martínez, 2016) this article examines the emergence of what we term a “micropolitics of pandemic governance.” By “micropolitics” we refer to the socio-political relationships, interactions and bargaining between a range of State and/or non-state actors in a local context, generally aimed at influencing a particular area, policy or activity without the explicit goal to alter national-level power relations or institutions. Using the case of El Salvador, we examine how State (above) and non-state (below) actors (re)negotiated co-governance arrangements during the pandemic, as seen through the lens of support to the MSME sector.…”

Factores criminológicos del tráfico ilícito de drogas en el medio ambiente

“…Revista Académica de la Escuela de Posgrado de la Policía Nacional del Perú Vol. 3 N° 1, pp 63-70, julio -diciembre, 2023ISSN: 2810 estrategias de evasión han generado niveles moderados de violencia y en Nicaragua, las estrategias de colusión han producido niveles bajos de violencia vinculada con el tráfico de drogas (Blume, 2022).…”

Grammar of Threat: Governance and Order in Public Threats by Criminal Actors

“…Illicit economies operate outside of (formal) state regulation, and so extralegal violence-or at least the possibility of such violence-plays a significant role in ordering criminal activity (Schelling, 1971). However, most criminal actors moderate the frequency and visibility of their violence most of the time (Blume, 2022;Duran-Martinez, 2018). Threats are a useful way to induce desired behavior in a target without resorting to violence that risks drawing the attention of the state or reprisals from rival criminal actors (Lessing, 2015).…”