Collusion in Spatially Separated Markets with Quantity Competition

Andree, Kai

doi:10.1007/s10842-012-0126-9

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 12 publications

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“…4. The two-city model has also been used in different contexts by Gross and Holahan (2003), Liang, Hwang, and Mai (2006), Colombo (2011), andAndree (2013). In particular, the findings in the two-city model of Liang, Hwang, and Mai (2006) can be compared with our three-city model, thus showing the importance of the spatial asymmetry dimension (which is absent in Liang, Hwang, and Mai 2006).…”

Section: Appendixmentioning

confidence: 83%

A Model of Three Cities

Colombo

2016

International Regional Science Review

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We develop a spatial model representing three cities of different size and connected by a road. We study two versions of a two-stage game where firms first decide where to locate and then set quantities or prices. We show that, in the case of quantity competition, maximal dispersion or agglomeration arises. Also, multiple equilibria are possible. In the case of price competition, maximal dispersion or partial dispersion arises. An asymmetric spatial equilibrium is possible even if the model is completely symmetric ex ante. A number of results are also derived when comparing the Cournot and the Bertrand locational equilibria in terms of profits, consumer surplus, and total welfare, and with respect to the welfare-maximizing locations.

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Section: Appendixmentioning

confidence: 83%

A Model of Three Cities

Colombo

2016

International Regional Science Review

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Spatial price discrimination and location choice with labor markets

Guo

Lai

2013

Ann Reg Sci

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Pricing Decisions in Dual-Channel Supply Chain Including Monopolistic Manufacturer and Duopolistic Retailers: A Game-Theoretic Approach

2016

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Emergence of the Internet as a new distribution channel has led to increasing attention by researchers to dual-channel supply chain in recent years. In this paper, pricing and ordering decisions are investigated on a dual-channel supply chain which consists of monopolistic manufacturer and duopolistic retailers. The market is assumed to be controlled by the manufacturer. Thus, the manufacturer becomes leader and the two retailers act as followers. Due to establishing this new structure, different game-theoretic models including Bertrand, Collusion, and Stackelberg are developed to analyze pricing strategies under the various interactions between the two retailers. Then, the equilibrium decisions are compared under the considered scenarios and valuable managerial insights are presented. We found that the various games do not have any effects on the manufacturer's responses. The retail prices given by the Collusion game are higher than by the other games. In the Collusion model, demands in the retail channel are lower than in the other games. Moreover, the manufacturer and retailers receive respectively the lowest and the highest profits under the Collusion game.

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Collusion in Spatially Separated Markets with Quantity Competition

Cited by 5 publications

References 12 publications

A Model of Three Cities

A Model of Three Cities

Spatial price discrimination and location choice with labor markets

Pricing Decisions in Dual-Channel Supply Chain Including Monopolistic Manufacturer and Duopolistic Retailers: A Game-Theoretic Approach

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