Colombia's Peace in Tatters

Abstract

Although Ioris and Ioris (2018) provide a correct and insightful understanding of the rural historical origins of the Colombian conflict, their interpretation of the Havana Accord-held from 2012 to 2016-is flawed. Their argument reinforces the status quo and official views held by the state. According to the authors, the agreement is not and should not be thought of as a process of state reform. In contrast, I argue that the peace agreement proposed in Colombia should be seen as a presidential and elite-driven 1 social pact that turned into a political and electoral dispute, transforming the peacebuilding process in Colombia into a wobbly endeavour. To better understand the complexity of the Havana Accord, the traditional land claim perspective should be re-centred as an inequality reduction and a long-term development plan. Throughout this article, I point out new directions to the challenges faced by the collapsing agreement.

La relevancia de la paz positiva para enfrentar desafíos sociales: el post-acuerdo de paz y la pandemia de covid-19 en Colombia

“…Desde una perspectiva de paz positiva, trae más que un posible fin a la violencia en Colombia. De hecho, el Acuerdo aborda desafíos históricos a la protección social profundamente arraigados y legados por el conflicto -además de una refundación velada del Estado colombiano (CHAGAS-BASTOS, 2018).…”

Can Community Resettlement be Considered a Resilient Move? Insights from a Slow-Onset Disaster in the Colombian Andes

“…[Figure 1 about here] The peace, however, remains contested and in a fragile state (Chagas-Bastos, 2018;Retteberg, 2018). In the midst of the Colombian conflict, the indigenous peoples of Aponte, the Inga, resisted guerrilla occupation of their lands and successfully reclaimed their ancestral territory.…”

Self-organization for everyday peacebuilding: The Guardia Indígena from Northern Cauca, Colombia

“…The Northern Cauca region is one of the territories in which the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo: FARC-EP) had a strong influence until the end of 2016, when a peace agreement was signed with the Colombian government. The agreement aimed for a reduction in inequality and a long-term development plan for Colombia (Chagas-Bastos, 2018), and even included an innovative gender perspective whose goal was to ensure women's leadership in peacebuilding and prevent sexual violence in armed conflicts (Boutron, 2018). The treaty thus represented a real opportunity for change.…”

“…After several changes, however, the agreement was subsequently approved by Congress and immediately resulted in a general decrease in violence. Nonetheless, given that the areas most affected by the conflict – like Northern Cauca – were historically marginalized from state support and management (Chagas-Bastos, 2018; Velasco, 2016), new criminal bands were already fighting to control these territories by the end of 2017 (Valencia et al, 2017). Moreover, in 2018, as many as 56 social leaders were killed in Cauca by unknown assailants ( El Tiempo , 2018).…”