Combatant Fragmentation and the Dynamics of Civil Wars

Findley, Michael G.; Rudloff, Peter

doi:10.1017/s0007123412000099

Cited by 49 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 59 publications

(90 reference statements)

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“…[1]). These efforts include examinations of geography and other structures within countries [50][51][52][53][54][55][56][57][58][59][60][61][62][63][64][65][66][67] as well as the effects of transnational geography [68][69][70][71][72][73][74][75][76][77][78][79]. Extensive analysis explores the role of political structures, particularly federalism, in enabling or preventing civil and ethnic conflict [80][81][82][83][84][85][86][87][88][89][90][91][92][93][94][95][96][97][98]…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Good Fences: The Importance of Setting Boundaries for Peaceful Coexistence

Rutherford

Harmon

Werfel³

et al. 2011

SSRN Journal

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We consider the conditions of peace and violence among ethnic groups, testing a theory designed to predict the locations of violence and interventions that can promote peace. Characterizing the model's success in predicting peace requires examples where peace prevails despite diversity. Switzerland is recognized as a country of peace, stability and prosperity. This is surprising because of its linguistic and religious diversity that in other parts of the world lead to conflict and violence. Here we analyze how peaceful stability is maintained. Our analysis shows that peace does not depend on integrated coexistence, but rather on well defined topographical and political boundaries separating groups, allowing for partial autonomy within a single country. In Switzerland, mountains and lakes are an important part of the boundaries between sharply defined linguistic areas. Political canton and circle (sub-canton) boundaries often separate religious groups. Where such boundaries do not appear to be sufficient, we find that specific aspects of the population distribution guarantee either sufficient separation or sufficient mixing to inhibit intergroup violence according to the quantitative theory of conflict. In exactly one region, a porous mountain range does not adequately separate linguistic groups and that region has experienced significant violent conflict, leading to the recent creation of the canton of Jura. Our analysis supports the hypothesis that violence between groups can be inhibited by physical and political boundaries. A similar analysis of the area of the former Yugoslavia shows that during widespread ethnic violence existing political boundaries did not coincide with the boundaries of distinct groups, but peace prevailed in specific areas where they did coincide. The success of peace in Switzerland may serve as a model to resolve conflict in other ethnically diverse countries and regions of the world.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Good Fences: The Importance of Setting Boundaries for Peaceful Coexistence

Rutherford

Harmon

Werfel³

et al. 2011

SSRN Journal

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“…Violence is a function of the economic returns to war; there are neither policies nor political offices at stake. Third, and most prominently, theorists adapt bargaining models of interstate war to the civil context (Blattman and Miguel ; Walter ), arguing that civil violence reflects information problems (Findley and Rudloff ; Walter ) or commitment problems (Fearon ; Hale ; Walter ).…”

Section: Bringing the Government Back Inmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Governments Shape the Risk of Civil Violence: India's Federal Reorganization, 1950–56

Lacina

2013

American J Political Sci

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Governments are absent from empirical studies of civil violence, except as static sources of grievance. The influence that government policy accommodations and threats of repression have on internal violence is difficult to verify without a means to identify potential militancy that did not happen. I use a within-country research design to address this problem. During India's reorganization as a linguistic federation, every language group could have sought a state. I show that representation in the ruling party conditioned the likelihood of a violent statehood movement. Prostatehood groups that were politically advantaged over the interests opposed to them were peacefully accommodated. Statehood movements similar in political importance to their opponents used violence. Very politically disadvantaged groups refrained from mobilization, anticipating repression. These results call into question the search for a monotonic relationship between grievances and violence and the omission of domestic politics from prominent theories of civil conflict.

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“… Findlay and Rudolff () use a computational model, but focus on the process of fragmentation, rather than fragmentation as a characteristic of the opposition. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Actor Fragmentation and Civil War Bargaining: How Internal Divisions Generate Civil Conflict

Cunningham¹

2013

American J Political Sci

145

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Wars within states have become much more common than wars between them. A dominant approach to understanding civil war assumes that opposition movements are unitary, when empirically, most of them are not. I develop a theory for how internal divisions within opposition movements affect their ability to bargain with the state and avoid conflict. I argue that more divided movements generate greater commitment and information problems, thus making civil war more likely. I test this expectation using new annual data on the internal structure of opposition movements seeking self-determination. I find that more divided movements are much more likely to experience civil war onset and incidence. This analysis suggests that the assumption that these movements are unitary has severely limited our understanding of when these disputes degenerate into civil wars.

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Combatant Fragmentation and the Dynamics of Civil Wars

Cited by 49 publications

References 59 publications

Good Fences: The Importance of Setting Boundaries for Peaceful Coexistence

Good Fences: The Importance of Setting Boundaries for Peaceful Coexistence

How Governments Shape the Risk of Civil Violence: India's Federal Reorganization, 1950–56

Actor Fragmentation and Civil War Bargaining: How Internal Divisions Generate Civil Conflict

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