Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology

Extended cognition and epistemic luck

“…He goes even further to conclude that knowledge is present in Gettier cases. For a recent criticism of Hetherington on these points, see Madison (2011). It is worth pointing out that anti-luck epistemologists can agree with Hetherington that Case 2 is a case of lucky knowledge while denying that the case is lucky in a way that is, by reference to veritic luck, incompatible with knowledge.…”

“…The jokester, however, overlooked the doctor's appointment, leaving the original and correct time intact. 7 For a sample of some explicit statements on this point, see for example Swain (1978), Lewis (1996), Kvanvig (2003Kvanvig ( , 2004, Pritchard (2003Pritchard ( , 2004Pritchard ( , 2005Pritchard ( , 2007Pritchard ( , 2009), Steup (2008), Luper (2010), Madison (2011), Kelp (2012a), Jarvis (2012), Carter (2010Carter ( , 2011 and Carter, Jarvis & Rubin (2012a, 2012b). This list is far from exhaustive.…”

“…This line of thought is developed, in a qualified way, by Sosa (2007), who distinguishes between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge 28 . Sosa thinks reflective knowledge is not compatible with the kind of environmental luck at play in barn facade cases, though he is willing to grant (lower-grade) animal knowledge in such cases.…”

“…Kelp (2012b) for a related discussion on this point. 28 On Sosa's view, animal knowledge is apt belief-belief that is accurate because adroit. Reflective knowledge is meta-apt belief, which is apt belief, aptly noted.…”

Fake Barns and False Dilemmas

“…If you're looking for reasons to be skeptical of the suggestion that knowledge is an achievement, Hacker (2013), Lackey (2007), and Whiting (2012) are good places to look. 5 For arguments for the malignancy of epistemic luck, see Engel (1992), Madison (2011), andPritchard (2005). For a discussion of the difference between intervening and environmental luck, see Jarvis (forthcoming) and Pritchard (2009b).…”