Combinatorial auctions

Abstract

Combinatorial auctions are an important class of market mechanisms in which participants are allowed to bid on bundles of multiple heterogeneous items. In this paper, we discuss several complex issues that are encountered in the design of combinatorial auctions. These issues are related to the formulation of the winner determination problem, the expression of combined bids, the design of progressive combinatorial auctions that require less information revelation, and the need for decision support tools to help participants make profitable bidding decisions. For each issue, we survey the existing literature and propose avenues for further research.

GRASP with Hybrid Path Relinking for Bi-Objective Winner Determination in Combinatorial Transportation Auctions

“…There exists a multitude of WDP models for different scenarios (for an overview, see, e.g., De Vries andVohra 2003 or Abrache, Crainic, andRekik 2007). However, multi-objective formulations of the winner determination problem are still missing.…”

Eleven surveys in operations research: II

“…Combinatorial auctions (4OR 2/1, Abrache et al 2004): Jawad Abrache, Teodor Gabriel Crainic, Michel Gendreau, and Monia Rekik review several contributions from the Operations Research literature on a particular type of auctions in which participants are allowed to bid on bundles of multiple heterogeneous items.…”

Eleven surveys in Operations Research

“…They are a fascinating area of research that is shared by many disciplines: Economics, Artificial Intelligence and Management. In Combinatorial Auctions (4OR 2(1), Abrache et al 2004) Jawad Abrache, Teodor Gabriel Crainic, Michel Gendreau and Monia Rekik study a particular type of auctions in which participants are allowed to bid on bundles of multiple heterogeneous items. In such auctions, many important problems arise linked to the determination of the winner, the way to express combined bids, the design of progressive combinatorial auctions, and the support to participants.…”